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Abstract Norms can be used in multi-agent systems for defining patterns of behaviour in
terms of permissions, prohibitions and obligations that are addressed to agents playing a
specific role. Agents may play different roles during their execution and they may even play
different roles simultaneously. As a consequence, agents may be affected by inconsistent
norms; e.g., an agent may be simultaneously obliged and forbidden to reach a given state
of affairs. Dealing with this type of inconsistency is one of the main challenges of nor-
mative reasoning. Existing approaches tackle this problem by using a static and predefined
order that determines which norm should prevail in the case where two norms are inconsis-
tent. One main drawback of these proposals is that they allow only pairwise comparison of
norms; it is not clear how agents may use the predefined order to select a subset of norms to
abide by from a set of norms containing multiple inconsistencies. Furthermore, in dynamic
and non-deterministic environments it can be difficult or even impossible to specify an order
that resolves inconsistencies satisfactorily in all potential situations. In response to these two
problems, we propose a mechanism with which an agent can dynamically compute a prefer-
ence order over subsets of its competing norms by considering the coherence of its cognitive
and normative elements. Our approach allows flexible resolution of normative inconsisten-
cies, tailored to the current circumstances of the agent. Moreover, our solution can be used
to determine norm prevalence among a set of norms containing multiple inconsistencies.
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1 Introduction
Norms are used in multi-agent systems to define control and coordination mechanisms in-
tended to influence the behaviour of autonomous and heterogeneous agents [30]. In this
paper, norms specify the expected behaviour of roles in terms of obligations, permissions
and prohibitions. In particular, we regard normative specifications as being conditional ex-
pressions that specify under which circumstances instances of norms must be created and
deleted (i.e., when instances become active and when they expire) [25,30,35,11]. The cir-
cumstances as well as the roles played by agents may change at execution time. Therefore,
the instances that apply to agents are a priori unknown. Moreover, there may be inconsisten-
cies1 among these instances; e.g., an agent may be simultaneously obliged and forbidden to
bring about a given state of affairs. Since inconsistency only arises at execution time, agents
must be endowed with mechanisms for resolving inconsistency when it arises. Dealing with
this type of inconsistency is a key challenge of normative reasoning.
Existing work concerning normative agents typically proposes the use of a static order
based on norm salience (i.e., importance of norms) to determine which instance prevails in
the case of inconsistency (i.e., the instance created out of the most salient norm prevails) [7,
12,4,41]. However, a significant drawback of such work is the fact that the order is specified
off-line and is hard-wired into agents. Thus, the work assumes that it is possible to spec-
ify an order that appropriately resolves any inconsistency that may arise at execution time.
This assumption is too strong for dynamic and non-deterministic environments in which the
performance of the system may be unpredictable. In these circumstances it can be difficult,
or even impossible, to specify an order that ensures that inconsistencies are resolved satis-
factorily in any situation. This may be even more complicated in systems in which norms
can be changed on-line. Thus, agents may be in a situation in which they must resolve an
inconsistency among instances that have been created out of norms defined at run-time. In
addition, agents should resolve normative inconsistencies when there are not only several
inconsistency relationships among a set of instances but also cognitive elements that can
support or oppose these instances. In these kinds of situations, it is not obvious how to use a
static, predefined, order over norms to determine which of the instances should prevail.
In response, in this paper we propose to endow Normative Graded BDI agents [11] with
a mechanism to dynamically resolve inconsistencies among several instances based on co-
herence theory principles [39]. Coherence is a cognitive theory whose main purpose is the
study of associations; i.e., how representational elements (e.g., cognitive elements and nor-
mative elements) influence each other by imposing a positive or negative constraint over the
rest of the representational elements. Coherence dynamically computes a preference order
over the power set of instances by considering the constraints among a set of represen-
tational elements. Therefore, our coherence-based solution can adapt to different cognitive
states depending on the information that an agent has at its disposal. Moreover, it can be used
to select a subset of coherent instances from a set of instances containing multiple incon-
sistencies. We analyse the performance of our solution for resolving inconsistencies across
different examples and experiments. With this information, we determine which kinds of
applications may potentially benefit from using our solution.
In this paper we use a running example to: (i) motivate the need for our coherence max-
imisation process to solve normative inconsistencies; and (ii) illustrate how an agent carries
out the different steps of the coherence maximisation process to resolve inconsistencies
in a particular situation. Let us consider a case study of the management of websites in a
1 In this paper we will use the terms inconsistency and normative inconsistency as synonyms.
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university. Specifically, let us assume the existence of a webManager agent, in charge of dy-
namically distributing websites into two servers that are maintained by the university. Note
that the webManager agent is not the addressee of the norms, which is instead the person
that created the websites being maintained by the webManager. However, the webManager
agent must reason about the norms that are addressed to the website creator. Thus, the web-
Manager agent acts as a proxy for the website creator2. One of these servers, identified by
slow, is dedicated to maintaining personal websites of students, academics, etc. The other
server, identified by fast , is a faster server that is dedicated to maintaining websites that are
of high importance to the university; e.g., conference websites, e-learning sites, etc. There
are four norms that specify which server must or must not be used in each particular situa-
tion: (i) there is a norm that obliges the webManager agent to use the server that is not under
maintenance at a given moment; (ii) there is a general prohibition against using fast since it
must be devoted to important pages; (iii) when a webpage belongs to an academic and slow
is overloaded, then fast can be used; and (iv) it is forbidden to store webpages on any server
when the security of the whole system is compromised. In what follows, we illustrate that it
is possible for instances of these norms to be active simultaneously, so that the webManager
agent must make a decision about which instance prevails.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides the necessary definitions, while
Section 3 provides an overview of coherence theory; in Section 4 we instantiate coherence
theory for the problem of resolving normative inconsistencies; Section 5 assesses the per-
formance of our proposal for resolving inconsistencies between two instances in different
situations; Section 6 presents an experimental analysis of performance for inconsistencies
among larger sets of instances; and, finally, a discussion of related work and conclusions are
contained in Sections 7 and 8, respectively.
2 Preliminary Definitions
2.1 Basic Definitions
We make use of a first-order predicate language L whose alphabet includes: the logical
connectives {∧,∨,¬}; equality and inequality symbols; the true (>) and false propositions
(⊥); an infinite set of variables; and predicate, constant and function symbols. Variables
are implicitly universally quantified3. In this paper, variables are written as any sequence
of alphanumeric characters beginning with a capital letter. Predicate, constant and function
symbols are written as any sequence of alphanumeric characters beginning with a lower case
letter. Let us assume the standard definition for well-formed formulas (wffs). We make use
of the standard notion of substitution of variables in a wff ; i.e., σ is a finite and possibly
empty set of pairs Y/y where Y is a variable and y is a term [20]. R and A are the sets
containing all role and agent identifiers, respectively. In particular, self ∈ A is an agent
identifier representing the agent that is performing the reasoning process. For the purpose of
this paper it is necessary to know that the relationship between agents and roles is formally
represented by a binary predicate (play). Specifically, the expression play(a, r) describes
the fact that the agent identified by a ∈ A enacts the role identified by r ∈ R.
2 The existence of normative agents that mediate between external agents or humans and multi-agent
systems is not new. For example, in Electronic Institutions [19] there are governor agents that guarantee that
external agents comply with the norms of the institution.
3 In this paper, we regard norms as conditional expressions that specify under which general circumstances
they must be instantiated.
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2.2 Normative Definitions
Norms help to define control, coordination and cooperation mechanisms that attempt to: (i)
promote behaviours that are satisfactory to the organisation, i.e., actions that contribute to
the achievement of global goals; and (ii) avoid harmful actions, i.e., actions that may lead to
an undesirable state. Norms have been studied from different perspectives such as philoso-
phy [43], sociology [36], law [1], etc., and multi-agent systems research has given different
meanings to the norm concept. For example, it has been employed as a synonym of obliga-
tion and authorization [14], social law [33], social commitment [38] and other kinds of rules
imposed by societies or authorities. The purpose of this paper is not to propose, compare or
improve existing normative definitions, but to make use of these definitions in proposing a
coherence-based mechanism to allow agents to resolve normative inconsistencies. The aim
of this section is to provide the basic normative notions used in the paper.
In particular, in this paper we consider norms as formal statements that define patterns of
behaviours by means of deontic modalities (i.e., obligations, permissions and prohibitions).
Specifically, our proposal is based on the notion of a norm as a general rule of behaviour that
defines under which circumstances a pattern of behaviour must be instantiated. This notion
of norm has been widely used in the existing literature (e.g., [25], [30], [35] and [11]).
Definition 1 (Norm) A norm is defined as a tuple n = 〈∆,C, T,A,E〉, where:
– ∆ ∈ {O,F ,P} is the deontic modality of the norm, determining if the norm is an
obligation (O), prohibition (F) or permission (P);
– C is a wff of L that represents the norm condition on the affected agents, i.e., it denotes
the state of affairs that the target of the norm must do/bring about (in the case of obliga-
tions), refrain from generating (in the case of prohibitions), or is permitted to do/bring
about (in the case of permissions);
– T ∈ R is the target of the norm; i.e., the role to which the norm is addressed;
– A is a wff of L that describes the activation condition;
– E is a wff of L that describes the expiration condition.
For example, the norm that obliges use of the server that is not being maintained is
represented as follows:
〈O, use(S1), universityMember,maintenance(S2) ∧ S1 6= S2,¬maintenance(S2)〉
Similarly, the norm that forbids the use of fast is represented as follows:
〈F , use(fast), universityMember,>,⊥〉
The norm that permits academics to use fast when slow is overloaded defined as follows:
〈P, use(fast), academicStaff , highTraffic(slow), lowTraffic(slow)〉
Finally, the norms that forbids the use of any server in case of a security problem is for-
malised as follows:
〈F , use(fast) ∧ use(slow), universityMember, securityThreat ,¬securityThreat〉
Once the activation condition of a norm holds several instances, according to the ground-
ings of the activation condition (i.e., the sets of bindings of variables that occur on the ac-
tivation condition), are created. Thus, an instance is an unconditional expression that binds
agents playing a given role to an obligation, prohibition or permission. Instances remain
active until their expiration condition holds.
A Coherence Maximisation Process For Solving Normative Inconsistencies 5
Definition 2 (Instance) Given a norm n = 〈∆,C, T,A,E〉 and a knowledge base Γ of L,
an instance of n under the substitution σ is defined as the tuple i = 〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉 where:
– σ is a substitution of variables in A such that Γ ` σ · A and σ · C, σ · A, σ · E are
grounded;
– A¯ = σ ·A, E¯ = σ · E, C¯ = σ · C.
Both the activation and the expiration conditions of norms might be undefined. When
the activation condition is undefined (i.e., when A is >), the norm is instantiated by default
and an instance of this norm is always active. When the expiration condition is undefined
(i.e., when E is ⊥), there is no state of affairs that causes instances created out of this norm
to expire. For a complete description of the dynamics and operational semantics of norms
and instances within a multi-agent system see [9].
For example, if we assume that slow is maintained (i.e., Γ ` maintenance(slow)), then
the previous obligation norm is instantiated as follows.
〈O, use(fast), universityMember,maintenance(slow),¬maintenance(slow)〉
To ensure that all instances have no free variables, we define the notion of well-formed
norm as follows.
Definition 3 (Well-Formed Norm) A norm n = 〈∆,C, T,A,E〉 is a well-formed norm iff
VA ⊇ VE ∪ VC ; where VX is the set of variables occurring in wff X.
2.2.1 Instance Inconsistency
Intuitively, we consider that two instances are inconsistent when they prescribe patterns of
behaviours that are contradictory (i.e., logically incompatible). In particular, two obliga-
tion instances are inconsistent if fulfilling them both would lead to a contradiction (i.e., if
the two instances have norm conditions that are logically incompatible); the same is true
of two prohibition instances. An inconsistency between a permission instance and an obli-
gation/prohibition instance exists if achieving the norm condition of the permission and
fulfilling the obligation/prohibition would lead to a contradiction. Similarly, an obligation
instance and a prohibition instance are inconsistent if fulfilling them both would lead to a
contradiction. Given that permissions do not prescribe that agents must or must not bring
about states of affairs, a situation in which an agent is permitted to bring about contradictory
states is not defined as an inconsistency. More formally, we define inconsistency of instances
as follows.
Definition 4 (Inconsistency of instances) Two instances 〈∆1, C¯1, T 1, A¯1, E¯1〉 and 〈∆2,
C¯2, T 2, A¯2, E¯2〉 are inconsistent iff one of the following conditions holds:
– ∆1 = O, ∆2 = O and {C¯1, C¯2} `⊥;
– ∆1 = F , ∆2 = F and {¬C¯1,¬C¯2} `⊥;
– ∆1 = O, ∆2 = P and {C¯1, C¯2} `⊥;
– ∆1 = P , ∆2 = O and {C¯1, C¯2} `⊥;
– ∆1 = P , ∆2 = F and {C¯1,¬C¯2} `⊥.
– ∆1 = F , ∆2 = P and {¬C¯1, C¯2} `⊥.
– ∆1 = O, ∆2 = F and {C¯1,¬C¯2} `⊥;
– ∆1 = F , ∆2 = O and {¬C¯1, C¯2} `⊥;
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As explained above, the cases in the definition cover all possible inconsistency relationships
between two instances, and that no other inconsistency relationships are possible.
In our example, there is a norm that forbids the use of fast . Obviously, an instance of
this norm is inconsistent with the instance that obliges the webManager agent to use fast
due to the fact that slow is being maintained.
In this paper, we use a “closed legal system”, which is a normative system where every-
thing is considered as permitted by default. Permissions specify exceptions to the application
of more general obligations and prohibitions. Thus, a permission creates an inconsistency
with a more general instance by identifying specific situations in which the more general
instance does not apply. In our example, suppose that the webManager agent is dealing with
a website belonging to an academic and that slow is overloaded with visits. In this case the
norm that permits use of fast is instantiated. According to our definition, this instance is
inconsistent with the instance that forbids the use of fast .
2.2.2 Instance Satisfaction
Intuitively, we consider that one instance satisfies another when they are in accordance (i.e.,
when one instance prescribes a pattern of behaviour that entails the pattern of behaviour
prescribed by other instance). In particular, two obligation, prohibition or permission in-
stances satisfy each other when they are in accordance (i.e., if the two instances have norm
conditions that are related by logical entailment). A permission instance and an obliga-
tion/prohibition instance satisfy each other when fulfilling the obligation/prohibition entails
achieving the norm condition of the permission, and vice versa. Similarly, an obligation in-
stance and prohibition instance satisfy each other when fulfilling one of the instances entails
the fulfilment of the other instance. And there are no more satisfaction relationships between
two instances. More formally, we define satisfaction of instances as follows.
Definition 5 (Satisfaction of one instance by another) The instance 〈∆1, C¯1, T 1, A¯1, E¯1〉
satisfies the instance 〈∆2, C¯2, T 2, A¯2, E¯2〉 iff one of the following conditions holds:
– ∆1 = F , ∆2 = F and ¬C¯1 ` ¬C¯2;
– ∆1 = O, ∆2 = O and C¯1 ` C¯2;
– ∆1 = P , ∆2 = P and C¯1 ` C¯2;
– ∆1 = O, ∆2 = P and C¯1 ` C¯2;
– ∆1 = P , ∆2 = O and C¯1 ` C¯2;
– ∆1 = F , ∆2 = P and ¬C¯1 ` C¯2;
– ∆1 = P , ∆2 = F and C¯1 ` ¬C¯2.
– ∆1 = O, ∆2 = F and C¯1 ` ¬C¯2;
– ∆1 = F , ∆2 = O and ¬C¯1 ` C¯2;
As explained above, the cases in the definition cover all possible satisfaction relationships
between two instances, and no other satisfaction relationships are possible.
In our example, the instance that permits the use of fast for academic webpages when
slow is overloaded satisfies the instance that obliges the use of fast (due to the maintenance
of slow). Furthermore, let us suppose that an attacker intrusion has been detected. In this
situation the security protection norm is instantiated and, as a consequence, the use of either
fast or slow is forbidden. This instance satisfies the instance that forbids the use of fast .
In this paper we propose the use of coherence theory to deal with situations in which
agents are affected not only by inconsistent instances but also by instances that satisfy an-
other.
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2.3 Normative Agent Definition
We assume a practical reasoning agent [3] whose actions are controlled by norms and di-
rected towards its goals. Specifically, we focus on how an agent resolves the inconsistencies
among the instances that affect it. To make such decisions, we propose that the agent con-
siders: the salience of norms (which has been defined in [5] as the degree of activity and
importance of a norm within a social group and a given context) that have given rise to the
instances, the ease of compliance of these instances (i.e., how difficult it is for an agent to
comply with these instances), the agent environment (i.e., the certainty of the beliefs about
the agent’s current circumstances) and the impact of instances (i.e., the importance of the
desires hindered or favoured by the instances). In order to capture these different parameters,
and to allow our agents to deal with dynamic and non-deterministic environments, we use
the Normative Graded BDI architecture (known as n-BDI) [11], which extends the Graded
BDI architecture proposed by Casali et al. in [6] with an explicit representation of norms
and instances.
Definition 6 (n-BDI Agent) An n-BDI agent is defined as a tuple 〈B,D, I,N,NI〉, where:
– B,D, I are the sets of graded beliefs, desires and intentions of the agent. These sets are
composed of M(γ, ρ) expressions, where: M ∈ {belief, desire, intention} is a graded
modality used for representing graded beliefs, desires or intentions, respectively; γ is a
grounded formula of L; and ρ ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree associated with this mental
formula. ρ represents a certainty degree in case of belief, a desirability degree in case of
desires4, and an intentionality degree in case of intentions5.
– N is a set formed by norm(n, ρs) expressions, where n is a norm, and ρs ∈ [0, 1] is a
real value that assigns a salience to this norm. This salience represents the importance
of the norm.
– NI is a set composed of instance(i, ρc) expressions, where i is an instance, and ρc ∈
[0, 1] is a real value that specifies the ease of compliance of the instance. This ease of
compliance represents how difficult it is for the agent to comply with the instance.
Thus, the setsB,D, and I contain the cognitive elements, whereas the setsN andNI contain
the normative elements.
Our aim is not to provide a complete description of the reasoning process performed by
n-BDI agents, the complete details of which can be consulted in [11]6. For the purpose of
this paper, it is only necessary to know that the reasoning process of n-BDI agents is mainly
performed by deductive rules that connect cognitive and normative elements. In particular,
the information flows from perception to action according to three main steps. Firstly, the
agent perceives the environment and updates its beliefs, norms and instances accordingly.
In particular, the agent revises the norms that are in force in its environment (i.e., the norms
that have been established and not abolished). It then creates new instances out of the norms
for which the activation conditions have become true and removes those instances that have
expired. Secondly, in the deliberation step, the desire set is revised (e.g., new desires may
4 As defined in [6], the desirability of a formula γ represents to what extent an agent wants to achieve a
situation in which γ holds.
5 According to [6], intentions are not considered as a basic attitude. Thus, the intentions of n-BDI agents
are generated on-line from the agents’ beliefs and desires. The intentionality degree of a formula γ is the
consequence of finding a best feasible plan that permits a state of the world where γ holds to be achieved.
6 See [10] for the pseudocode of the algorithm executed by n-BDI agents.
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be created out of the user preferences). Also as part of the deliberation step, the agent con-
siders the set of instances and makes a decision about which to comply with. This decision
about compliance entails dealing with any inconsistencies among the active instances. The
mechanism proposed in this paper allows these n-BDI agents to dynamically resolve these
inconsistencies. The instances that the agent decides to comply with are translated into de-
sires. Finally, in the decision making step, desires and beliefs are considered for deriving
intentions.
Regarding the procedures by which norms are added and removed from N , for the pur-
pose of this paper it is only necessary to assume that an n-BDI agent is endowed with
procedures for maintaining a norm base that contains current norms; i.e., the norms that are
in force at a given moment. For example, norms and their salience can be specified off-line
by the designer of the normative system [1], who determines the importance of norms in the
norm hierarchy. Norms and their salience can also be determined on-line by analysing per-
ceptions that are relevant to norm recognition. These perceptions can be explicit normative
perceptions, which correspond to those messages exchanged by agents in which norms and
their salience are explicitly communicated (e.g., in [11] the authors propose methods for in-
ferring norms and their salience by combining the information sent by multiple experts); or
implicit normative perceptions, which correspond to the observation of actions performed
by agents (e.g., where the inference of norms and their salience is based on imitation ap-
proaches [17], or on an analysis of normative signals such as punishments, sanctions and
rewards [42]).
With regard to the set of instances NI , we assume that n-BDI agents are endowed with
procedures for adding new instances and removing expired instances from NI . In particular,
an instance is created whenever there is some substitution that causes the grounded activa-
tion condition (under that substitution) of the norm to be entailed from the agent’s beliefs
and a belief that represents that the agent enacts the target role of the norm (in the follow-
ing we refer to this type of belief as addressing beliefs). When an instance is created, the
agent estimates the ease of compliance by considering the difficulty of complying with the
instance. In this paper, we will assume that n-BDI agents know the effects of actions; i.e.,
they have beliefs such as belief (effect(α, γ), ρ) that represents that the agent knows that
action α causes γ with a certainty degree ρ. Thus, the ease of compliance with a particu-
lar instance can be calculated at run-time simply by considering the certainty with which
available actions fulfil the instance. For example, an agent that is affected by an obligation
to store web pages on a server that it knows to be unavailable (i.e., there is no action to
save files to the server) may determine that the ease of compliance of this instance is 0 and,
as a consequence, it has no chance of complying with the instance. In [8] the authors have
proposed more elaborate methods for calculating the ease of compliance according to the
impact of instances on the agent goals and emotions. Finally, instances are removed from
NI when the expiration condition is entailed from the agent’s beliefs. Note that instances
are not removed once the agent no longer believes it is playing the target role, which models
the fact that instances created under some role must be fulfilled even if the agent stops en-
acting this role. For example, if a seller has contracted an obligation to deliver an item to a
buyer who has paid for this item, then the seller must deliver the item even if he stops being
a seller. However, norms that expire once agents stop enacting the target role can also be
represented by redefining the expiration condition as a disjunction between the expiration
condition and the addressing belief.
Table 1 shows an example of the formulas present in knowledge base of the webManager
agent at some point of its execution. For simplicity, we ignore the contents of the cognitive
sets and focus on the normative sets. The behaviour of the webManager agent is regulated
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by the four norms that are contained in the set N , labelled as n1, n2, n3 and n4 in the N row
of Table 1. Let us assume that the four norms have been instantiated with the maximum ease
of compliance (indicating that there are no barriers to complying with any of the instances
individually), creating the instances i1, i2, i3 and i4 in row NI of Table 1.
Sets Content
B ....
D ...
I ...
N norm(n1, 1), norm(n2, 0.6), norm(n3, 0.3), norm(n4, 0.8)
NI instance(i1, 1), instance(i2, 1), instance(i3, 1), instance(i4, 1)
where n1 = 〈O, use(S1), universityMember,maintenance(S2) ∧ S1 6= S2,¬maintenance(S2)〉
n2 = 〈F , use(fast), universityMember,>,⊥〉
n3 = 〈P, use(fast), academicStaff , highTraffic(slow), lowTraffic(slow)〉
n4 = 〈F , use(fast) ∨ use(slow), universityMember, securityThreat ,¬securityThreat〉
i1 = 〈O, use(fast), universityMember,maintenance(slow),¬maintenance(slow)〉
i2 = 〈F , use(fast), universityMember,>,⊥〉
i3 = 〈P, use(fast), academicStaff , highTraffic(slow), lowTraffic(slow)〉
i4 = 〈F , use(fast) ∨ use(slow), universityMember, securityThreat ,¬securityThreat〉
Table 1: Knowledge base of the webManager agent
Among these instances there are satisfaction and inconsistency relationships. We also
consider there to be a satisfaction relationship between an instance and the norm from which
it was created. Figure 1 shows these relationships among the instances and norms. Instances
are represented by ellipses labelled with the instance itself and its ease of compliance. These
instances have been created out of four norms that are also represented by ellipses labelled
with the norm and the salience of the norm. Satisfaction (vs. inconsistency) relationships
among these normative elements are represented by continuous (vs. dashed) lines. As de-
picted by the figure, the webManager agent faces a situation in which it is affected by several
consistent and inconsistent instances, which have been created out of norms with different
salience values. This is an example of a situation in which it is not straightforward to decide
which instance or instances should prevail7. Furthermore, in this example we have not con-
sidered the relationships between instances and cognitive elements (e.g., desires that may
either support or oppose the fulfilment of instances), which would further complicate the
decision were they to be taken into account.
In this paper we address complex situations like that illustrated by our example, in which
agents should resolve normative inconsistencies when there are not only several inconsis-
tency and satisfaction relationships among a set of instances but also cognitive elements that
can support or oppose these instances. In these kinds of situations, it is not obvious how to
use a static, predefined salience order over norms to determine which of the instances should
prevail. To address this problem, we propose a coherence maximisation process for allowing
n-BDI agents to resolve normative inconsistencies in a dynamic way that adapts to current
circumstances depending on the cognitive elements available.
7 In this case the static order will determine that just the instance created out of the most salient norm
should prevail. In Section 5 we demonstrate that approaches that only rely on salience to solve normative
inconsistencies can lead to undesired results, even if only two instances are considered.
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Fig. 1: Instances and norms affecting the webManager agent. Ellipses represent the norma-
tive elements. Coherence relationships among these elements are represented by continuous
lines, whereas dashed lines represent incoherence relationships.
3 Coherence Theory
In [39] Thagard claims that coherence is a cognitive theory whose main purpose is the
study of associations; i.e., how representational elements (cognitive and normative elements
in our case) influence each other by imposing a positive or negative constraint over the
rest of the elements. In [40] coherence is explained in terms of maximal satisfaction of
multiple constraints. In particular, a coherence problem is formalised as follows. Let V be
a finite set of elements {vi} which may be propositions or other representations, and C a
set of constraints on V understood as a set {(vi, vj)} of pairs of elements of V representing
coherence and incoherence relationships between elements. C divides into C+, the positive
constraints (i.e., the coherence relationships) on V , and C−, the negative constraints (i.e., the
incoherence relationships) on V . There is a function ζ that associates with each constraint
a number, which is the weight (strength) of the coherence or incoherence relationship. The
problem is to partition V into two sets, accepted A and rejected R, in a way that maximises
compliance with the following two coherence conditions:
– if (vi, vj) is in C+ then vi is in A if and only if vj is in A;
– if (vi, vj) is in C− then vi is in A if and only if vj is in R.
The coherence problem is to partition V intoA andR in a way that maximises the coherence
of the partition, that is, the sum of the weights of satisfied constraints.
In [40], the authors prove that the problem of calculating coherence is NP-complete and
they provide several algorithms for maximising coherence.
– Exhaustive Search. The simplest way of maximizing coherence is to consider all the
different ways of accepting and rejecting elements and calculate the coherence of each.
The problem of this approach is that for a set V with |V| elements, there are 2|V| possible
acceptance sets, which makes this approach intractable for reasonably sized problems.
– Incremental Algorithm. This is a simple serial algorithm in which an arbitrary ordering
is applied to the elements. For each element in the ordering, if adding it to A increases
the total weight of satisfied constraints more than adding it to R, then it is added to A;
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otherwise it is added toR. Obviously, this algorithm does not guarantee that the optimal
solution is found, but it can be used to model bounded rationality [37].
– Greedy Algorithm. This algorithm starts with a randomly generated solution and then
improves it by flipping elements from the accepted set to the rejected set or vice versa.
This algorithm has been demonstrated to have good performance in several coherence
problems [40].
– Connectionist Algorithm. This algorithm uses a neural network to assess coherence.
While there are no mathematical guarantees on the quality of the solutions, empirical
results yield excellent results for problems of a variety of sizes [40] (e.g., the connec-
tionist algorithm has been used to solve problems with more than 400 elements and
more than 10000 coherence links).
– Semidefinite Programming Algorithm. This algorithm is guaranteed to satisfy a high
proportion of the maximum satisfiable constraints. In particular, the weight of the con-
straints satisfied by a solution will be at least 0.878 times the weight of the constraints
satisfied by the optimal solution.
In his work, Thagard solved different kinds of coherence problems following this con-
straint maximisation approach. Given that in n-BDI agents the relationships among cognitive
and normative elements are defined in terms of deductive rules, we focus on deductive co-
herence, which is concerned with coherence among logical propositions that belong to a
deductive system. Next, the deductive coherence principles are explained in detail.
3.1 Deductive Coherence
According to Thagard’s definition, deductive coherence [39] is a coherence problem whose
elements are related by deductive coherence (ζ) yielded by propositional logical deduction.
There are five principles that establish relations of deductive coherence and that allow the
global coherence of a deductive system to be assessed. Given P,Q and P1, ..., Pn as propo-
sitions of a deductive system S, the principles of deductive coherence [39] are as follows.
1. Symmetry. Deductive coherence is a symmetric relation.
2. Deduction. If P1, ..., Pn deduce Q, then:
(a) Any proposition coheres with propositions that are deductible from it. Thus, for each
Pi in {P1, ..., Pn}, Pi and Q cohere.
(b) Propositions that together are used for deducing some other proposition cohere with
each other. For each Pi and Pj in {P1, ..., Pn} Pi and Pj cohere.
(c) The more hypotheses it takes to deduce something, the less the degree of coherence.
Thus, in (a) and (b) the degrees of coherence are inversely proportional to n.
3. Intuitive Priority. Propositions that are intuitively obvious have a degree of acceptability
on their own.
4. Contradiction. Contradictory propositions are incoherent with each other.
5. Acceptability. The acceptability of a proposition in a system of propositions depends on
its coherence with them.
Once the general notion of deductive coherence has been provided, it is necessary to
adapt this general theory in order to address the particular problem of resolving inconsisten-
cies among normative instances.
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4 Coherence for Solving Inconsistencies
The formalisation described in this section has been inspired by the work of Joseph et al.
in [23], where a formalisation of the notion of deductive coherence for graded logics is
proposed. In particular, Joseph et al. propose to model deductive coherence problems as
graphs: nodes represent graded propositional formulas; edges are the positive or negative
constraints between these formulas; and each constraint has a weight expressing the strength
of the coherence or incoherence relationship. In this section we apply this formalisation of
deductive coherence to consider the relationships among cognitive elements and the mental
representation of norms and instances in order to resolve normative inconsistencies.
4.1 Building the Coherence Graph
The coherence graph of an n-BDI agent is defined as follows.
Definition 7 (Coherence Graph [23]) A coherence graph is an edge-weighted undirected
graph g = 〈V, C, ζ〉 where:
– V is a finite set of nodes representing all the information relevant to the inconsistency
problem;
– C ⊆ [V]2 is a finite set of constraints representing the coherence or incoherence between
nodes8;
– ζ : C → [−1, 1] \ {0} is the coherence function that assigns a value to the coherence
between nodes.
Definition 8 (Satisfied Constraints [23]) Given a coherence graph g = 〈V, C, ζ〉 and a
partition A of V , the set of satisfied constraints CA ⊆ C is:
CA = {{v, w} ∈ C | v ∈ A iff w ∈ A, when ζ({v, w}) > 0} ∪
{{v, w} ∈ C | v ∈ A iff w 6∈ A, when ζ({v, w}) < 0}
All other constraints are said to be unsatisfied.
Definition 9 (Coherence Maximisation [23]) Given a coherence graph g = 〈V, C, ζ〉, max-
imising the coherence is the problem of partitioning nodes into two sets (accepted A and
rejected R = V \ A) such that the coherence of the partition is maximal.
4.1.1 Nodes of the Coherence Graph
In this paper we propose that n-BDI agents resolve inconsistencies by considering: (i) the
beliefs that support the activation and expiration of instances (i.e., the formulas in B); (ii)
the norms that have been instantiated (i.e., the formulas in N9); (iii) instances and the satis-
faction and inconsistency relationships between them (i.e., the formulas in NI ); and (iv) the
desires that are hindered or favoured by instances (i.e., the formulas in D)10.
8 Recall that deductive coherence is a symmetric relationship and, as a consequence, constraints in the
coherence graph are defined over the set of all subsets of two elements of V .
9 Recall that the expressions in N contain a norm and the salience of this norm.
10 Recall that n-BDI agents translate instances into desires that will be considered for deriving intentions.
Thus, intentions are not a basic attitude and there is not a direct link between instances and intentions. As a
consequence, the set of intentions is not considered for resolving inconsistencies.
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Definition 10 (Nodes of the Coherence Graph) Given an n-BDI agent 〈B,D, I,N,NI〉,
the nodes of the coherence graph corresponding to this agent are defined as V = VNI ∪VN ∪
VB ∪ VD where:
– VNI = NI
– VN =
{
norm(n, ρs)
∣∣∣∣ norm(n, ρs) ∈ N ∧ instance(i, ρc) ∈ NI :there is a substitution σ such that i is an instance of n under σ
}
– VB =
{
belief (X, ρX)
∣∣∣∣belief (X, ρX) ∈ B ∧ instance(〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉, ρc) ∈ NI :((X ` A¯) ∨ (X ` play(self , T )) ∨ (X ` E¯))
}
– VD =
{
desire(X, ρX)
∣∣∣∣desire(X, ρX) ∈ D ∧ instance(〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉, ρc) ∈ NI :((X ` C¯) ∨ (C¯ ` X))
}
recall that the expression play(self , T ) represents that the agent plays role T .
4.1.2 Coherence of the Graph
Now that the nodes of the coherence graph have been defined, the coherence function must
be defined. To make sure that the coherence function is symmetric, we first define a general
support function [23] between two nodes Φ and Ψ of the coherence graph. This general sup-
port function evaluates the support of a node Φ in deriving node Ψ . According to principle
2(a) of deductive coherence, any proposition coheres with propositions that are deductible
from it. In the case of resolving normative inconsistencies, we need to establish coherence
relationships between instances and the formulas that deduce them: i.e., the general sup-
port function should define the coherence degree between a norm and its instances, between
beliefs that support an instance (i.e., beliefs that support the activation of the instance and
addressing beliefs) and this instance, between instances that satisfy each other, and between
a desire and an instance that is satisfied by the desire. Principle 2(b) of deductive coherence
states that propositions that together are used for deducing some other proposition cohere.
Thus, the general support function should also define the coherence degree between beliefs
that deduce instances, and between a norm and the beliefs that support instances of this
norm. Principle 4 of deductive coherence, which states that contradictory propositions are
incoherent, thus the general support function should also define the incoherence degree be-
tween an instance and the beliefs that sustain its expiration, between inconsistent instances,
and between an instance and the desire hindered by this instance. Finally, note that the aim
of the coherence maximization process is not to revise desires or check the coherence of the
normative system, and because of this the general support function does not consider other
coherence and incoherence relationships.
Given that nodes of the coherence graph might be norms, instances, beliefs and desires,
we have defined several specialised support functions according to the type of nodes that are
being considered. We formalise the general support function (η) as follows.
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Definition 11 (General Support Function for the Coherence Graph) A general support
function (η : V × V → [−1, 1]) is given by:
η(Φ, Ψ) =

ηBB(Φ, Ψ) if Φ = belief (X, ρX) and Ψ = belief (Y, ρY )
ηBN (Φ, Ψ) if Φ = belief (X, ρX) and Ψ = norm(n, ρs)
ηBNI (Φ, Ψ) if Φ = belief (X, ρX) and Ψ = instance(i, ρc)
ηNNI (Φ, Ψ) if Φ = norm(n, ρs) and Ψ = instance(i, ρc)
ηNINI (Φ, Ψ) if Φ = instance(i
1, ρ1c) and Ψ = instance(i2, ρ2c)
ηNID(Φ, Ψ) if Φ = instance(i, ρc) and Ψ = desire(X, ρX)
undefined otherwise
Support Function for Beliefs (ηBB) The specialised support function ηBB is responsible for
defining the coherence degree between two beliefs (belief (X,ρX) and belief (Y, ρY )) that
are used together for deducing an instance (instance(〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉, ρc)). One of these
beliefs is the addressing belief and the other is a belief that supports the activation of the
instance11. ηBB has been defined capturing principle 2(b) of deductive coherence, which
claims that those formulas that are used together for deducing some other formula cohere
with each other. As a consequence, we define the degree of coherence between these two
beliefs as the conjunction between the ease of compliance of the instance that is inferred
and the conjunction between the two supporting beliefs. Continuous t-norms are possible
truth functions of conjunction in many-valued logics. The three most important continu-
ous t-norms are [18]: Lukasiewicz t-norm, Go¨del t-norm and Product t-norm. We have
selected the Lukasiewicz t-norm since recent papers on representing and reasoning about
graded mental formulas have used it showing successful/interesting results and properties
[6]. Thus, we have calculated the conjunction between graded formulas as the strong con-
junction according to the Lukasiewicz t-norm [22] as:
x⊗ y = max(0, x+ y − 1)
Thus, we calculate the degree of coherence between the two beliefs considered by the sup-
port function ηBB as:
ρc ⊗ (ρX ⊗ ρY ) = max(0, ρc +max(0, ρX + ρY − 1)− 1)
where ρc is the ease of compliance of the instances inferred from the two beliefs and ρX , ρY
is the certainty of these beliefs. Principle 2(c) of deductive coherence claims that the more
hypotheses it takes to deduce something, the less the degree of coherence. Accordingly,
in function ηBB the coherence degree is inversely proportional to the number of formulas
that are required to infer instances. As a consequence, the degree of coherence has been
divided by 3, since 3 formulas (the activation belief, the addressing belief and the norm)
are required to infer the instance. The two beliefs considered by this function can be used
11 Notice that we assume that the agent performs a reasoning process, such as the one described in [6],
for inferring mental formulas (e.g., belief (a ∧ b,min{ρa, ρb})) that are a conjunction of separate mental
formulas (e.g., belief (a, ρa) and belief (b, ρb))
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together to deduce more than one instance. Thus, we define the coherence between the two
beliefs as the maximum among the coherence values caused by each instance that can be
inferred from the two formulas. Function ηBB is formally defined as follows.
Definition 12 (Support Function for Beliefs) A support function for beliefs (ηBB : V ×V → [0, 1] ∪ {undefined}) is given by:
ηBB(belief (X, ρX), belief (Y, ρY )) =max
{
max(0, ρc +max(0, ρX + ρY − 1)− 1)
3
∣∣∣∣ instance(〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉, ρc) ∈ NI :(X ` A¯) ∧ (Y ` play(self , T ))
}
undefined otherwise
Support Function for Belief and Norms (ηBN ) Function ηBN calculates the coherence de-
gree between a belief and a norm that are used together to deduce an instance. Thus, it
has been defined capturing principles 2(b) and 2(c) of deductive coherence. Therefore, the
coherence degree is calculated as in the previous support function for beliefs. The only dif-
ference is that in this case the coherence degree is divided by 3 or 2, depending on the
activation condition; if the activation condition is undefined, only two hypotheses are re-
quired to infer the instance. Again, the same belief and norm can be used for inferring more
than one instance and we define the coherence as the maximum among the coherence values
caused by each instance.
Definition 13 (Support Function for Beliefs and Norms) A support function for beliefs
and norms (ηBN : V × V → [0, 1] ∪ {undefined}) is given by:
ηBN (belief (X, ρX), norm(〈∆,C, T,A,E〉, ρs)) =
max

max

max(0, ρc +max(0, ρs + ρX − 1)− 1)
3
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
instance(〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉, ρc) ∈ NI :
A, A¯ are not undefined and
there is a substitution σ such that
〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉 is an instance of
〈∆,C, T,A,E〉 under σ and
((X ` A¯) ∨ (X ` play(self , T )))

max

max(0, ρc +max(0, ρs + ρX − 1)− 1)
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
instance(〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉, ρc) ∈ NI :
A, A¯ are undefined and ((∆ = ∆)∧
(C = C¯) ∧ (E = E¯)∧
(X ` play(self , T )))


undefined otherwise
Support Function for Beliefs and Instances (ηBNI ) This support function defines the co-
herence among beliefs that support the activation or expiration of instances. Therefore, this
function is defined according to principles 2(a), 2(c) and 4 of deductive coherence. Princi-
ple 2(a) claims that any proposition coheres with propositions that are deductible from it.
As a consequence, beliefs that deduce instances cohere with these instances. We define the
coherence degree between the instance and the belief as the conjunction between these two
formulas divided by the number of formulas that are required to infer the instance (according
to principle 2(c)). In the case of a belief that supports the expiration of an instance, this for-
mula is contradictory to the instance12. Principle 4 claims that contradictory propositions are
incoherent with each other. For this reason, function ηBNI defines incoherence relationships
between instances and the beliefs that support the expiration of these instances. Specifically,
12 Note that agents are still under the influence of any instance even if they stop enacting the target role of
this instance. Because of this, we have not defined an incoherence relationship between instances and beliefs
that represent the fact that the agent is no longer playing the target role of instances.
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we have calculated the incoherence as the weak conjunction according to the Lukasiewicz
t-norm [22]:
x ∧ y = min(x, y)
Thus, we calculate the degree of incoherence between an instance and the belief that sup-
ports the instance expiration as:
ρX ∧ ρc = −min(ρX , ρc)
where ρc is the ease of compliance of the instance and ρX is the certainty of the expiration
belief. In this case we use the weak conjunction since an instance and a belief that sustain
the expiration of this instance are always incoherent, whatever their degrees.
Definition 14 (Support Function for Beliefs and Instances) A support function for beliefs
and instances (ηBNI : V × V → [−1, 1] ∪ {undefined}) is given by:
ηBNI (belief (X, ρX), instance(〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉, ρc)) =
max(0, ρX + ρc − 1)
3
if A¯ is not undefined and ((X ` A¯) ∨ (X ` play(self , T )))
max(0, ρX + ρc − 1)
2
if A¯is undefined and X ` play(self , T )
−min(ρX , ρc) if X ` E¯
undefined otherwise
Support Function for Norms and Instances (ηNNI ) This support function defines the co-
herence among norms and their instances as the conjunction between these two formulas
divided by the number of formulas that are required to infer the instance.
Definition 15 (Support Function for Norms and Instances) A support function for norm
and instances (ηNNI : V × V → [0, 1] ∪ {undefined}) is given by:
ηNNI (norm(n, ρs), instance(〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉, ρc)) =
max(0, ρs + ρc − 1)
3
if A¯ is not undefined and there is a substitution σ such that
〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉 is an instance of n under σ
max(0, ρs + ρc − 1)
2
if A¯ is undefined and 〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉 is an instance of n under ∅
undefined otherwise
Support Function for Function for Instances (ηNINI ) This support function creates incoher-
ence links between instances when they are inconsistent. In addition, this support function
creates coherence links between instances when they are consistent.
Definition 16 (Support Function for Instances) A support function for instances (ηNINI :
V × V → [−1, 1] ∪ {undefined}) is given by:
ηNINI (instance(i
1, ρ1c), instance(i
2, ρ2c)) =

−min(ρ1c , ρ2c) if i1 and i2 are inconsistent
(max(0, ρ1c + ρ
2
c − 1)) if i1 satisfies i2
undefined otherwise
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Support Function for Instances and Desires (ηNID) This support function is responsible
for creating coherence (vs. incoherence) links between instances and the desires that are
favoured (vs. hindered) by them. For example, a desire to achieve a given goal is favoured
by an instance that specifies this goal as obligatory. Similarly, a desire to achieve a given
goal is hindered by an instance that specifies this goal as forbidden. Thus, ηNID has been
defined according to principles 2(a) and 4 of deductive coherence.
Definition 17 (Support Function for Instances and Desires) A support function for in-
stances and desires (ηNID : V × V → [−1, 1] ∪ {undefined}) is given by:
ηNID(instance(〈∆, C¯, T, A¯, E¯〉, ρc), desire(X, ρX)) =
max(0, ρc + ρX − 1) if ∆ = O ∧ ((X ` C¯) ∨ (C¯ ` X))
−min(ρc, ρX) if ∆ = F ∧ ((X ` C¯) ∨ (C¯ ` X))
undefined otherwise
In this paper we assume that permissions specify exceptions to the application of more gen-
eral obligations and prohibitions. Therefore, permissions do not directly affect the agent’s
desires; i.e., they do not imply that some state of affairs must be achieved or avoided. For
this reason, we do not create a coherence link between permission instances and desires.
In order to make coherence a symmetric relationship, the deductive coherence between
two nodes Φ and Ψ is defined as the maximum of the two support function values that
evaluate the support of Φ in deriving Ψ and vice versa. The maximum is chosen due to
the fact that, even if there is only a deduction relation in one of the directions, there is a
deductive coherence between the two formulas [23].
Definition 18 (Coherence Function[23]) A deductive coherence function for the coher-
ence graph ζ : V(2) → [−1, 1] \ {0} ∪ {undefined} is given by:
ζ({Φ, Ψ}) =

max(η(Φ, Ψ), η(Ψ,Φ)) if η(Φ, Ψ) 6= 0 and η(Ψ, Φ) 6= 0
η(Φ, Ψ) if η(Φ, Ψ) 6= 0 and (η(Ψ,Φ) = 0 or undefined)
η(Ψ, Φ) if η(Ψ,Φ) 6= 0 and (η(Φ, Ψ) = 0 or undefined)
undefined if η(Ψ,Φ) = 0 or undefined and η(Φ, Ψ) = 0 or undefined
4.1.3 Edges of the Coherence Graph
Finally, the set of edges or constraints of a coherence graph are defined as follows
C = {{Φ, Ψ}|Φ, Ψ ∈ V and ζ({Φ, Ψ}) 6= undefined}
The set of satisfied constraints (CA ⊆ C) is calculated as in Definition 8.
The coherence graph corresponding to our running example is depicted by Figure 2a, in
which the coherence between the norm n1 and its instance i1 is calculated as:
ζ({norm(n1, 1), instance(i1, 1)}) = ηNNI (norm(n1, 1), instance(i1, 1)) =
max(0, 1 + 1− 1)
3
= 0.33
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(a) Consistency Graph
Partition Calculation Method
i1 i2 i3 i4
∑ |ζ({v, w})| ∑ |ζ({v,w})||A|√
2.27 2.272 = 1.14√
2.1 2.12 = 1.05√ √
2.37 2.374 = 0.59√
2.30 2.302 = 1.15√ √
5.57 5.574 = 1.39√ √
2.4 2.44 = 0.6√ √ √
3.67 3.676 = 0.61√
2.33 2.332 = 1.17√ √
2.6 2.64 = 0.65√ √
5.43 5.434 = 1.36√ √ √
3.70 3.706 = 0.62√ √
2.63 2.634 = 0.66√ √ √
3.90 3.906 = 0.65√ √ √
3.73 3.736 = 0.62√ √ √ √
3 38 = 0.38
(b) Coherence of partitions
Fig. 2: Inconsistency Resolution in the webManager agent example
Similarly, the coherence between the rest of the norms and instances is calculated by the
ηNNI function as the conjunction between these two formulas divided by 3, since the ac-
tivation condition of all norms has been defined (see row N in Table 1). The coherence
relationship between instances is calculated by function ηNINI . For example, the coherence
between the two instances that forbid use of fast (i.e., the instances i2 and i4) is calculated
as:
ζ({instance(i2, 1), instance(i4, 1)}) = ηNINI (instance(i2, 1), instance(i4, 1)) =
max(0, 1 + 1− 1) = 1
The coherence between the instances i1 and i3 is calculated in the same way. Finally, the
incoherence between instances is also calculated according to the ηNINI function. For ex-
ample, the incoherence between i1 and i2 is calculated as:
ζ({instance(i1, 1), instance(i2, 1)}) = ηNINI (instance(i1, 1), instance(i2, 1)) =
−min(1, 1) = −1
Once the links of the coherence graph have been calculated, it is necessary to calculate
the coherence of the partitions to find a partition that maximises coherence.
4.2 Calculating the Coherence Of Partitions
As mentioned in Section 3, Thagard defines the coherence of a partition as the sum of the
weights of the constraints satisfied by this partition. According to this definition, two par-
titions in which the sum of satisfied constraints is the same are equally coherent regardless
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of the number of nodes that belong to each partition. In this paper we want to explore al-
ternative definitions for the coherence of a partition. Specifically, we consider the following
calculation methods: sum of satisfied constraints and sum of satisfied constraints divided by
the cardinality of the accepted set.
Sum of Satisfied Constraints This calculation method corresponds to the original calculation
proposed by Thagard.
Definition 19 (Sum of Satisfied Constraints [39]) Given a coherence graph g = 〈V, C, ζ〉
the coherence of a partition of nodes in V into accepted A and rejected R sets is calculated
as: ∑
{v,w}∈CA
|ζ({v, w})|
This is a cumulative measure; i.e., the consideration of new constraints that are satisfied by
a partition always increases the coherence of this partition.
Sum of Satisfied Constraints Divided by the Cardinality of the Accepted Set The number
of nodes (i.e., instances) that are accepted is an important factor in our problem, since the
higher the number of instances that the agent tries to fulfil, the more difficult it may be for
the agent to fulfil all of them. Thus, we propose to calculate the coherence of a partition by
taking into account the cardinality of the accepted set as follows.
Definition 20 (Sum of Satisfied Constraints Divided by the Cardinality of the Accepted
Set) Given a coherence graph g = 〈V, C, ζ〉, the coherence of a partition of nodes in V into
accepted A and rejected R sets is calculated as:∑
{v,w}∈CA
|ζ({v, w})|
|A|
This is also a cumulative measure.
Other calculation methods that are not cumulative, such as calculating coherence as
the sum of satisfied constraints divided by the number of satisfied constraints, have not
been considered since, with such methods, the addition of new constraints satisfied by the
partition does not always imply that the coherence of this partition increases. This may cause
undesirable results. For example, considering a new constraint that supports an instance
(e.g., the coherence between an instance and a desire that is favoured by this instance) may
decrease the coherence of the partition that contains this instance if the weight of the new
constraint is not high enough. This makes no sense, since having more evidence sustaining
a particular instance always implies that accepting this instance is more coherent.
4.3 Determining the Partitions for Consideration
Our aim is to dynamically derive a preference order over the power set of active instances, so
that for each (non empty) subset of the active instances we construct a partition that contains
all elements (cognitive and normative) except those instances that are not part of the subset.
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Definition 21 (Partitions for Consideration) Given an n-BDI agent 〈B,D, I,N,NI〉 with
coherence graph g = 〈V, C, ζ〉, the partitions of V that the agent considers are each members
of the following set:
{A ∪ V ′ | A ∈ ℘(NI) \ ∅ and V ′ = V \NI}
For each partition the agent considers, it uses its chosen calculation method (from the
previous section) to determine the coherence; from this, the most preferred subset of in-
stances can be derived (i.e., the one that corresponds to the partition that maximises co-
herence). It is possible that this most preferred subset of instances can contain inconsistent
instances; this implies that there is insufficient information present in the coherence graph
to decide which of the inconsistent instances should prevail.
As previously mentioned, the problem of solving coherence is NP-complete and the
cost of an exhaustive search algorithm increases exponentially with the number of elements.
In the case of using coherence to resolve normative inconsistencies, only instances can be
accepted or rejected. Thus, the number of possible acceptance sets is 2|NI | which is consid-
erably lower than the 2|V|. This means that even for large problems in which an agent has
thousands of cognitive and normative elements, our coherence-based approach for resolving
inconsistencies can be undertaken using connectionist, semidefinite programming or, even,
exhaustive search algorithms since only the specific instances that are active at a given mo-
ment are considered as elements that can be accepted or rejected. Moreover, our approach
can also be used by bounded rational agents that have limited capabilities for resolving nor-
mative inconsistencies. In this case, incremental or greedy algorithms can be used to resolve
inconsistencies.
In the running example, there are 15 possible subsets of instances that the webManager
agent must consider; thus the agent calculates the coherence of the 15 partitions of its co-
herence graph that correspond to these subsets, according to one of the calculation methods
proposed in the previous section. For example, if the webManager agent calculates coher-
ence as the sum of satisfied constraints, the coherence of the partition that corresponds to
the subset containing instances i1 and i3 is calculated as:∑
{v,w}∈CA
|ζ({v, w})| = |0.33|+ |1|+ |0.1|+ | − 1|+ | − 1|+ | − 1|+ | − 1| = 5.43
Similarly, if the webManager agent calculates coherence as the sum of satisfied constraints
divided by the cardinality of the accepted set, the coherence of the partition that corresponds
to the subset containing instances i1 and i3 is calculated as:∑
{v,w}∈CA
|ζ({v, w})|
|A| =
5.43
4
= 1.36
Figure 2b presents the coherence of the 15 partitions that the agent must consider, using
each of the two calculation methods. Specifically, each partition has been labelled according
to the instances that it contains. Regardless of the calculation method used, the partition that
maximises coherence is formed by instances i2 and i4. In this example, where the ease of
compliance of each instance is the same, coherence resolves the inconsistency by proposing
a solution in which more than one instance prevails and the static order is not obeyed (i.e., the
selected partition does not include the instance of the most salient norm, n1). Specifically,
the webManager agent decides to follow the two prohibition instances and not to use either
slow or fast due to the fact that the security of the whole system is compromised.
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5 Case Study
This section illustrates the performance of the coherence maximisation approach for resolv-
ing inconsistencies between two instances. Even in this simple case with only two instances,
it is not suitable to analyse mathematically the conditions under which the coherence max-
imisation process determines that a particular instance prevails over the other. As more nodes
(i.e., beliefs, desires and intentions) are added to the coherence graph, the conditions become
more complex and difficult to interpret. For these reasons, we have carried out experiments
to illustrate the performance of our coherence maximisation process for resolving inconsis-
tencies between two instances belonging to our running example. These experiments com-
pare our proposal against existing proposals and demonstrate that it allows agents to solve
normative inconsistencies by adapting the solution in response to a dynamic, uncertain and
non-deterministic environment. In particular, we have compared three inconsistency resolu-
tion strategies: (i) maximising coherence, which is the method proposed in this paper; (ii)
following the static order according to salience, which is the method used in the majority of
previous proposals [4,7,21] (see Section 7 for a discussion of previous work); and (iii) fol-
lowing a conditional order that determines which instance prevails according to a condition
[41].
In our experiments, we assume that there are two norms: the norm that forbids university
members to use fast :
nF = 〈F , use(fast), universityMember,>,⊥〉
and the norm that permits academic staff to use the fast server when slow is overloaded:
nP = 〈P, use(fast), academicStaff , highTraffic(slow), lowTraffic(slow)〉
The webManager determines that slow has high traffic when it has been accessed more
than 1000 times in the last hour. Accordingly, the certainty of the highTraffic(slow) propo-
sition is calculated by considering the number of visits that slow has received in the last
hour (which is denoted by v1) as follows:{
1 v1 ≥ 1000
v1
1000 0 < v1 < 1000
Similarly, the webManager agent determines that slow has low traffic when it has been ac-
cessed less than 2500 times in the last 24 hours. Thus, the certainty of the lowTraffic(slow)
proposition is calculated by considering the number of visits that slow has received in the
last 24 hours (which is denoted by v24) as follows:
1 v24 = 0
1− v242500 0 < v24 < 2500
0 v24 ≥ 2500
For example, when slow has received 1500 visits during the last hour and 5000 visits in the
last 24 hours, it is considered as high traffic with a certainty of 1. In contrast, when slow
has received 0 visits during the last hour and 50 visits in the last 24 hours, it is considered
as low traffic with a certainty of 0.98. Moreover, slow can have neither high traffic nor low
traffic. For example, when slow has received 0 visits during the last hour and 3000 visits
in the last 24 hours, it cannot be considered as high traffic or low traffic. Finally, slow can
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have both high and low traffic simultaneously. Suppose slow has received 280 visits during
the last hour and 1500 visits in the last 24 hours, this can be considered as high traffic with
a certainty of 0.28 and as low traffic with a certainty of 0.4.
Thus our simulation allows us to consider situations in which agents have to resolve
inconsistencies among two instances according to uncertain or conflicting data. In our ex-
periments, we compute: the percentage of times that the permission instance prevails; the
percentage of times that the prohibition instance prevails; and the percentage of times that
the inconsistency remains unresolved. In the situations where the inconsistency remains un-
resolved, the agent does not have sufficient information to decide between the two instances
and it is better to postpone the decision.
5.1 Influence of the Normative Elements on the Resolution of Inconsistencies
In this section we describe the results of an experiment that illustrates how the normative
elements present in the agent’s knowledge base affect the resolution of the inconsistency.
Let us consider the case in which a website that has been created by a lecturer (a member
of academic staff) was highly accessed in the past. Thus, two inconsistent instances were
created out of the two norms as follows:
iF = 〈F , use(fast), universityMember,>,⊥〉
iP = 〈P, use(fast), academicStaff , highTraffic(slow), lowTraffic(slow)〉
Sometime later, this lecturer leaves the university. As a result, the access to his website
decreases. Specifically, the website has received 0 visits during the last hour and 3000 visits
in the last 24 hours. This website cannot be considered either as a low-traffic website or a
high-traffic website (since fhighTraffic(0) = 0 and flowTraffic(3000) = 0), thus the agent
has no current beliefs that entail either the activation or expiration of either instance. This
scenario is depicted in Figure 3.
The webManager agent must resolve the inconsistency between the two instances by
considering the ease of compliance of the instances and the salience of the norms that have
given rise to the instances. When the permission norm is the most salient and the permission
instance is the easiest to comply with, it seems reasonable that the webManager ignores the
prohibition instance and follows the permission. Similarly, when the prohibition norm is the
most salient and the prohibition instance is the easiest to comply with, then the webManager
must focus on complying with the prohibition instance. When one norm is more important
but the agent is less able to comply with its instance, then it is not obvious which instance
should be followed. However, the permission norm is instantiated under certain conditions
that cannot be verified in this scenario (i.e., in the scenario depicted by Figure 3 there is no
belief supporting the activation of the permission instance, since the website has not received
a visit in the last hour). In contrast, the prohibition norm is instantiated by default (i.e., its
activation condition is undefined). When the ease of compliance order is inconsistent with
the salience order, and in the absence of any evidence that supports the activation of the
permission norm, it is reasonable to prefer the prohibition instance, since it is always active
and its validity can be taken for granted.
To examine how the coherence maximisation approach performs in such a situation
(where there are two inconsistent instances and no cognitive elements relevant to either
instance or to the norms they instantiate), we have performed an experiment that simulates
the scenario depicted by Figure 3, considering a range of values for the ease of compliance
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of each instance and for the salience of the norms they instantiate (summarised in Table 2).
Thus, for each run of the experiment an agent is affected by two inconsistent instances iP
and iF that have been created out of norms nP and nF , respectively; the salience of each
norm (i.e., ρPs and ρFs ) and the ease of compliance of each instance (i.e., ρPc and ρFc ) are
each randomly assigned to a real value within the [0, 1] interval. In this case, the conditional
order is defined considering the average of the ease of complying with an instance and the
salience of the norm it instantiates13. In all the experiments, we performed 1000 runs of the
experiment.
Parameter Value
Salience of the Permission Norm (ρPs ) [0, 1]
Salience of the Prohibition Norm (ρFs ) [0, 1]
Ease of Compliance of the Permission Instance (ρPc ) [0, 1]
Ease of Compliance of the Prohibition Instance (ρFc ) [0, 1]
Number of simulations 1000
Table 2: Parameters used for simulating an inconsistent pair of instances when there are no
cognitive elements relevant to the situation.
norm( n F ,ρs F )
norm( n P,ρs P )
instance( i F ,ρc F)instance( i P ,ρc P )
Fig. 3: Coherence graph of an inconsistent pair of instances when there are no cognitive
elements relevant to the situation.
Figure 4 depicts the results of this experiment. Specifically, we analyse the resolution of
the inconsistency in four different situations: Situation A, when the permission norm is the
most salient and the permission instance is the easiest to comply with (i.e., when ρPs ≥ ρFs
and ρPc ≥ ρFc ); Situation B, when the permission norm is the most salient but the prohibition
instance is the easiest to comply with (i.e., when ρPs ≥ ρFs and ρPc < ρFc ); Situation C, when
the prohibition norm is the most salient but the permission instance is the easiest to comply
with (i.e., when ρPs < ρFs and ρPs ≥ ρFs ); and Situation D, when the prohibition norm is the
13 In particular, the conditional order prefers the prohibition instance to the permission instance iff
ρFs + ρ
F
c
2
>
ρPs + ρ
P
c
2
otherwise the permission instance prevails.
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most salient and the prohibition instance is the easiest to comply with (i.e., when ρPs < ρFs
and ρPs < ρFs ).
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Fig. 4: For each situation, percentage of times in which the permission instance is followed,
percentage of times in which the prohibition instance is followed and percentage of times
the inconsistency remains unresolved for each resolution strategy. In Situation A ρPs ≥ ρFs
and ρPc ≥ ρFc . In Situation B ρPs ≥ ρFs and ρPc < ρFc . In Situation C ρPs < ρFs and ρPc ≥ ρFc .
In Situation D ρPs < ρFs and ρPc < ρFc .
Situations A and D each represent a situation in which the instance that it is easiest to
comply with is created from the most salient norm. As Figure 4 depicts, in these situations
the same results are obtained if the agent follows either the static or the conditional order; in
each case, the instance that has been created out of the most salient norm always prevails. If
we consider, however, the performance of the coherence approach in these situations, we see
that in 17% of runs the inconsistency remained unresolved. These unresolved inconsisten-
cies correspond to situations in which the agent does not have enough information to make
a decision. For example, if the ease of compliance of the instances is very low, which means
that the agent will find it hard to fulfil any of the instances, then it may be better to postpone
the decision to a later moment at which it has a greater chance of fulfilling the instances.
Situations B and C each represent a controversial situation in which the instance that
is easiest to comply with has been created out of the least salient norm. In these situations,
following the static order is not enough, since it always results in the agent following the in-
stance that has been created out of the most salient norm, regardless of the agent’s capability
of complying with it. Thus, the agent may decide to abide by an instance that it is unable
to comply with. The conditional order determines that either of the two instances is adhered
to with a probability of 50%. Finally, coherence is the only strategy that takes into account
the fact that the permission instance does not have an activation or expiration condition and
so is always active (i.e., the percentage of times that the prohibition instance is followed is
slightly higher than the percentage of times that the permission instance is followed). Thus,
coherence determines that the prohibition instance prevails in 39% of runs, whereas the per-
mission prevails in 27% of runs. Finally, coherence determines that in 32% of the cases the
agent does not have enough information and the inconsistency remains unresolved. Note
that in Situations B and C the information available for making a decision about norm com-
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pliance is contradictory and, as a consequence, the percentage of unresolved inconsistencies
is higher than in Situations A and D.
As previously mentioned there are two calculation methods by which the coherence of
partitions can be calculated. Figure 4 shows the results obtained when we calculate the co-
herence of partitions as the sum of satisfied constraints. We have repeated the experiment
described here but instead calculating the coherence of partitions as the sum of satisfied
constraints divided by the cardinality of the accepted set. Since only two instances are con-
sidered, the results obtained by the two methods are very similar (the only difference is
that the percentage of unresolved inconsistencies is slightly lower when the coherence of
partitions is calculated as the sum of satisfied constraints divided by the cardinality of the
accepted set). Thus, in this section we only include results obtained when coherence is cal-
culated as the sum of satisfied constraints. Section 6 presents the results of an experiment
that compares the two calculation methods.
Coherence approach more often avoids instances that cannot be fulfilled. The results shown
in Figure 4 demonstrate that our coherence approach produces different results to both the
static order and the conditional order. In order to demonstrate the appropriateness of the
result produced by the coherence approach, we have performed some calculations to de-
termine how often during our experiment each of the approaches selected an instance to
comply with that cannot be fulfilled.
We assume that agents are situated in a non-deterministic environment under uncertainty
and, as a consequence, it may be the case that the agent is unable to comply with a particular
instance. We determine whether this is the case probabilistically, where the probability in
which each instance cannot be fulfilled is 1 minus its ease of compliance14. From this figure
we determine that:
– in 22.84% of all runs, the coherence approach returns an instance that the agent cannot
comply with15;
– in 49.24% of all runs, the static order approach returns an instance that the agent cannot
comply with;
– in 37.52% of all runs, the conditional order approach returns an instance that the agent
cannot comply with.
Note that even if the instance that is easiest to comply with is always selected, then in
32.54% of cases the instance that is selected cannot be fulfilled. This analysis shows that the
coherence approach is less likely than both the conditional and the static order approaches
to return an instance that it is not possible to comply with.
We have also analysed those situations in which each of the two instances can be fulfilled
to consider how often each approach selects the least salient norm. We determine that:
– in 5.58% of those runs in which the agent can comply with both instances, the coherence
approach returns the instance that has been created from the least salient norm16;
– in 0% of those runs in which the agent can comply with both instances, the static order
approach returns the instance that has been created from the least salient norm;
14 In each run we generate a random number for each instance. We define that the instance can be fulfilled
when this number is greater than 1 minus its ease of compliance.
15 Note that we only consider the runs in which coherence selects one instance (i.e., the inconsistency does
not remain unresolved) and this instance cannot be fulfilled.
16 Note that we only consider the runs in which both instances can be fulfilled and coherence selects the
least salient instance (i.e., the inconsistency does not remain unresolved).
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– in 12.54% of those runs in which the agent can comply with both instances, the con-
ditional order approach returns the instance that has been created from the least salient
norm.
From this analysis we see that in only a few of those cases where the agent can comply
with both instances (5.58%), the coherence approach returns the instance that has been
created from the least salient norm. While it might seem more desirable in such cases that
the instance that was created from the most salient norm is always the one returned (such
as we see with the static order approach), the benefit gained from the coherence approach
by returning an instance that an agent cannot comply with significantly less often than the
other approaches offsets this behaviour.
5.2 Influence of the Cognitive Elements on the Resolution of Inconsistencies
5.2.1 Taking into Account the Roles Played by Agents
In this experiment we analyse the influence of the addressing beliefs. If the webManager
knows that its user is an academic, then it seems more reasonable to take into account the
permission instance, since it affects only academic staff. Similarly, if the webManager only
knows that its user is a university member, then it seems more reasonable to take into ac-
count the prohibition instance. If the agent does not know if its user is either an academic or
a university member17, then the decision must be taken according to the normative elements
(i.e., according to salience and ease of compliance). Moreover, we are interested in resolv-
ing inconsistency when the agent has ambiguous beliefs. Thus, if the webManager is sure
that its user is both a university member and an academic, then the agent knows that the two
norms are addressed to its user. In this situation the agent is affected by two inconsistent
instances that are sustained by two addressing beliefs that have the maximum certainty. In
the previous experiment (described in Section 5.1), the agent was also affected by two in-
consistent instances. However, these instances were not supported by any addressing belief,
which means that the agent has no evidence supporting the fact that it is its responsibility to
fulfil the instances. In the current experiment, the agent is completely sure that it is respon-
sible for fulfilling the two inconsistent instances. Because of this, the agent cannot postpone
this decision and should determine which one prevails. The agent is completely sure that the
user is affected by the prohibition instance, since the user is enacting the target role and the
norm is instantiated by default. In contrast, the agent has less evidence about the fact that
its user is affected by the permission (i.e., it only knows that the user is enacting the target
role, but it has no belief about the activation condition). Thus, it makes sense to give greater
precedence to the prohibition norm, since the agent is completely sure that it affects its user.
To investigate how the coherence maximisation approach performs in the situation where
there are two inconsistent instances and beliefs about the addressing role of each instance,
we performed an experiment that simulates the scenario shown in Figure 5, considering the
range of values for the ease of compliance of each instance and for the salience of the norms
they instantiate given in Table 2, and randomly assigning the values of ρacademicStaff and
ρuniversityMember (i.e., the certainty that the owner of the website is playing the role of
academic staff and university member, respectively) to either 0 or 1. In this case, the con-
ditional order is defined by considering the average of the ease to comply with an instance,
17 It may be the case that the two norms were instantiated at two points in the past, when the webManager
knew that its user was an academic and a university member. However, the webManager cannot determine in
the current situation whether its user is still the target of the two instances.
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the salience of the norm it instantiates and the certainty of the addressing belief that supports
it18.
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Fig. 5: Resolution of inconsistencies when there are addressing beliefs.
Figure 6 depicts the results. Specifically, we analyse the resolution of the inconsis-
tency in four different situations: Situation A, when the webManager knows that its user
is both an academic and a member of the university (i.e., when both ρacademicStaff and
ρuniversityMember are 1); Situation B, when the webManager only knows that its user
is an academic (i.e., when ρacademicStaff is 1 and ρuniversityMember is 0); Situation C,
when the webManager only knows that its user is a member of the university (i.e., when
ρuniversityMember is 1 and ρacademicStaff is 0); and Situation D, when the webManager
does not know whether its user is a member of the university or an academic (i.e., when both
ρacademicStaff and ρuniversityMember are 0).
If the agent follows the static order, then the addressing beliefs and any cognitive el-
ements are not taken into account and the behaviour exhibited by the webManager is the
same in all situations, so in the following sections we focus our discussion on the difference
in behaviour between the conditional order and the coherence approach.
In situations labelled as A the agent is addressed two inconsistent instances with the
maximum certainty. If the inconsistency is resolved by means of coherence, then the web-
Manager is able to recognise that the prohibition instance is active by default (as it has no
activation condition) while the agent has no current belief about the permission’s activation
condition. Specifically, the coherence approach recognises that the agent has less evidence
to support the requirement to fulfil the permission and determines that the prohibition pre-
vails almost twice as often as it determines that the permission prevails. In contrast, when
the agent resolves the inconsistency according to the conditional order, it makes the decision
according to the salience and the ease of compliance19 and is equally likely to determine that
either the prohibition or the permission instance should prevail.
Situations B and C each represent a situation in which only one of the instances is sus-
tained by an addressing belief (in Situation B, only the permission instance is sustained by an
addressing belief; in Situation C, only the prohibition instance is sustained by an addressing
18 In particular, the conditional order prefers the prohibition instance to the permission instance iff
ρFs + ρ
F
c + ρuniversityMember
3
>
ρPs + ρ
P
c + ρacademicStaff
3
otherwise the permission instance prevails.
19 Notice that the two addressing beliefs have a certainty of 1.
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Fig. 6: For each situation, percentage of runs in which the permission instance is followed,
percentage of runs in which the prohibition instance is followed and percentage of runs
in which the inconsistency remains unresolved for each resolution strategy. In Situation
A, ρacademicStaff = ρuniversityMember = 1. In Situation B, ρacademicStaff = 1 and
ρuniversityMember = 0. In Situation C, ρuniversityMember = 1 and ρacademicStaff = 0.
In Situation D, ρacademicStaff = ρuniversityMember = 0.
belief). In these situations, both the conditional order and the coherence approach determine
that the instance that is supported by an addressing belief should prevail significantly more
often than the instance that is not supported by an addressing belief. In a few cases, each
approach does decide that the instance that is not supported by an addressing belief should
prevail, when its ease of compliance and/or the salience of the norm it instantiates is higher
than that of the instance that is supported by an addressing belief. The main difference be-
tween the two approaches is that the coherence approach gives preference to the instances
supported by an addressing belief more often than the conditional approach.
In runs that fall under situation D, neither of the instances is sustained by an addressing
belief. Situation D is thus the same scenario that we examine in Section 5.1, in which the
instances were not supported by any addressing beliefs. For this reason, the results obtained
by each approach are the averages of all situations for the results presented in Section 5.1.
The coherence approach is the only resolution strategy that is able to differentiate be-
tween Situations A and D. Specifically, in Situation D (where it is unsure the website owner’s
roles require it to fulfil each of the instances) the coherence approach determines that there is
insufficient information to decide which instance should prevail in 26% of situations. This
is desirable since in the situation where the agent is not certain that the website owner is
required to comply with each instance, it is reasonable that it requires more information to
distinguish between the two instances.
Coherence approach more often avoids instances that are not addressed to the agent. To
further demonstrate the appropriateness of the result produced by the coherence approach,
we have performed calculations to determine how often during our experiment each of the
approaches selected an instance to comply with that is not addressed to the agent. Again we
assume that agents are situated in a non-deterministic environment under uncertainty and, as
a consequence, they cannot always determine correctly if they are the addressee of a given
instance. We determine this probabilistically, and specify that agents make mistakes when
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they determine the certainty of the addressing beliefs with a probability of 0.1. In particular,
we have analysed those runs in which the agent is the addressee of some of the instances
(i.e., we focus on situations where the agent is responsible for fulfilling at least one instance)
and we determine that:
– in 14.27% of these runs, the coherence approach returns an instance that is not addressed
to the agent;
– in 33.27% of these runs, the static order approach returns an instance that is not ad-
dressed to the agent;
– in 23.78% of these runs, the conditional order approach returns an instance that is not
addressed to the agent.
This analysis shows that the coherence approach is less likely than both the conditional and
the static order approaches to return an instance that is not addressed to the agent signifi-
cantly less frequently than other approaches.
5.2.2 Taking into Account the Agent Environment
We now consider the scenario in which the webManager agent has beliefs relating to the ac-
tivation and the expiration condition of the permission instance. In such a situation, the agent
has contradictory beliefs that sustain both the activation and the expiration of the permission
instance. According to the norm semantics assumed in this paper20, the expiration condition
specifies when an instance expires and should no longer be considered for compliance.
To investigate how the coherence maximisation approach performs in the situation where
there are two inconsistent instances and beliefs about the expiration and the activation of one
of these instances, we have performed an experiment that simulates the scenario shown in
Figure 7, considering the range of values for the ease of compliance of each instance and for
the salience of the norms they instantiate given in Table 2, randomly assigning the value of
v1 (the number of visits received by slow in the last hour) to a natural number in the interval
[0, 2500] and randomly assigning the value of v24 (the number of visits received by slow
in the last 24 hours) to a natural number in the interval [w1, 5000]. In this case, the condi-
tional order is defined by considering the average of the ease to comply with an instance,
the salience of the norm it instantiates, and (in the case of the permission only) the certainty
of the activation belief that supports it and 0 minus the certainty of the belief that supports
its expiration21.
Figure 8 depicts the results of this experiment. Specifically, we analyse the resolu-
tion of the inconsistency in four different situations: in Situation A the webManager has
high-certainty beliefs that sustain both the activation and the expiration of the permission
instance (i.e., ρhighTraffic(slow) ≥ 0.5 and ρlowTraffic(slow) ≥ 0.5); in Situation B the
webManager has a high-certainty belief that sustains the activation of the permission in-
stance and a low-certainty belief that sustains the expiration of the permission instance (i.e.,
ρhighTraffic(slow) ≥ 0.5 and ρlowTraffic(slow) < 0.5); in Situation C the webManager has
a low-certainty belief that sustains the activation of the permission instance and a high-
certainty belief that sustains the expiration of the permission instance (i.e., ρhighTraffic(slow) <
20 Such semantics have been widely used in previous research on agents and norms, such as [31] and [27].
21 The conditional order prefers the prohibition instance to the permission instance iff
ρFs + ρ
F
c
2
>
ρPs + ρ
P
c + ρhighTraffic(slow) − ρlowTraffic(slow)
4
otherwise the permission instance prevails.
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Fig. 7: Resolution of inconsistencies when there are beliefs that support the activation and
expiration of instances.
0.5 and ρlowTraffic(slow) ≥ 0.5); and in Situation D the webManager has a low-certainty be-
lief that sustains the activation of the permission instance and a low-certainty belief that sus-
tains the expiration of the permission instance (i.e., ρhighTraffic(slow) < 0.5 and ρlowTraffic(slow) <
0.5).
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Fig. 8: For each situation, percentage of times in which the permission instance is
followed, percentage of times in which the prohibition instance is followed and per-
centage of times in which the inconsistency remains unresolved for each resolution
strategy. In Situation A, ρhighTraffic(slow) ≥ 0.5 and ρlowTraffic(slow) ≥ 0.5. In
Situation B, ρhighTraffic(slow) ≥ 0.5 and ρlowTraffic(slow) < 0.5. In Situation C,
ρhighTraffic(slow) < 0.5 and ρlowTraffic(slow) ≥ 0.5. In Situation D, ρhighTraffic(slow) <
0.5 and ρlowTraffic(slow) < 0.5.
Situation A represents those cases where there is a high certainty about both the acti-
vation and the expiration of the permission. Here, where there is a high certainty that the
permission instance has expired, both the conditional order and the coherence approach
determine that the prohibition should prevail in the majority of cases; this is desirable be-
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haviour since it is very likely that the permission has expired and so should not be con-
sidered. This behaviour is more pronounced with the coherence approach (with which the
prohibition prevails in 100% of cases, compared with 80% of cases with the conditional
order approach), thus the coherence approach appears to be more heavily influenced by the
expiration beliefs than the conditional order.
In Situation B, the webManager has a high-certainty belief that sustains the activation of
the permission instance and a low-certainty belief that sustains the expiration of the permis-
sion instance. Here we see a marked difference in behaviour of the coherence approach and
the conditional approach, with coherence determining that the permission should prevail in
the majority of cases (66%) while the conditional approach determines that the prohibition
should prevail in the majority of cases (55%). The behaviour of the coherence approach in
this situation is desirable since the agent has a strong specific belief that it must consider the
permission, no strong belief that it ought not to consider the permission, and there are no
specific beliefs relating to the prohibition. Thus the coherence approach appears to be more
heavily influenced by the activation beliefs than the conditional order.
Situation C corresponds to cases in which the webManager has a low-certainty belief
that sustains the activation of the permission instance and a high-certainty belief that sustains
the expiration of the permission instance. Both the conditional order and the coherence
approach determine that the prohibition should prevail in the majority of cases (100% of
cases with the coherence approach; 94% of cases with the conditional order approach), as
we might expect since in the case in which the permission has expired, the agent ought not
to consider it. We argue that the behaviour of the coherence approach is more desirable than
that of the conditional order, since it always determines that the prohibition should prevail;
this is reasonable since in this case there is high certainty in the expiration belief.
Finally, situation D represents cases where the webManager has a low-certainty belief
that sustains the activation of the permission instance and a low-certainty belief that sus-
tains the expiration of the permission instance. If the agent resolves the inconsistency by
means of coherence, then the results are close to the average of the results obtained by the
coherence approach in the first experiment, where there were only normative elements for
consideration. In this case we observe that the prevalence of the prohibition is higher than
in the first experiment; this is reasonable since we have a low certainty belief that supports
the expiration of the permission instance. If the agent resolves the inconsistency according
to the conditional order, then the prohibition prevails in almost all cases; this is not a desir-
able outcome since a low-certainty belief in the expiration of the permission should not be
enough to mean that it is almost never considered. In the case where the agent is not very
sure that the permission has expired, the other factors for consideration (i.e., salience, ease
of compliance, certainty of activation) ought to influence the outcome, as we see with the
coherence approach.
Coherence approach more often avoids expired instances. To determine how often during
our experiment each of the approaches selected an instance to comply with that has expired,
we performed some calculations. In particular, we assume that agents are situated in a non-
deterministic environment under uncertainty and, as a consequence, they cannot determine
with certainty whether the permission has expired (i.e., if lowTraffic(slow) is true). We
determine whether this is the case probabilistically, where the probability that the permission
has expired is 1 minus the certainty that slow is experiencing low traffic. In particular, we
have analysed those runs in which the permission has expired and we determine that:
– in 8.79% of these runs, the coherence approach returns an instance that has expired (i.e.,
it returns the permission norm);
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– in 51.91% of these runs, the static order approach returns an instance that has expired;
– in 20.99% of these runs, the conditional order approach returns an instance that has
expired.
This analysis shows that the coherence approach is less likely than both the conditional and
the static order approaches to return an expired instance. This is desirable behaviour since
there is no need to comply with expired instances.
5.2.3 Taking into Account the Agent Desires
Here we assume that the website owner has an explicit desire that the website is allocated to
fast (use(fast)). The desirability degree of this desire (ρuse(fast)) indicates how important
this desire is to the website owner. For example, a website containing some funny graphic
animations might not be important enough to strongly desire that it is allocated to fast ,
even if slow is overloaded and requests are served with long delays; while it may be very
important that a website through which students obtain files needed for an assignment is
allocated to fast . The coherence graph corresponding to this scenario is depicted by Figure
9. The desire to use fast is hindered by the prohibition and so there is a negative constraint
between the desire and the prohibition instance.
To investigate how the coherence maximisation approach performs in the situation where
there are two inconsistent instances and a desire that is hindered by one of these instances,
we performed an experiment that simulates the scenario shown in Figure 9, considering the
range of values for the ease of compliance of each instance and for the salience of the norms
they instantiate given in Table 2, and randomly assigning the value of ρuse(fast) to a real
value in the interval [0, 1]. In this case, the conditional order is defined by considering the
average of the ease to comply with an instance, the salience of the norm it instantiates, and
(in the case of the prohibition only) the desirability degree of the desire that it hinders.22
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Fig. 9: Resolution of Inconsistencies according to convenience of instances.
Figure 10 depicts the results of this experiment. Specifically, we analyse the resolution
of the inconsistency in two different situations: in Situation A, the webManager strongly
22 In particular, the conditional order prefers the prohibition instance to the permission instance iff
ρFs + ρ
F
s − ρuse(fast)
3
>
ρPs + ρ
P
c
2
otherwise the permission instance prevails.
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desires that the website is allocated to the fast server (i.e., ρuse(fast) ≥ 0.5); in Situation B,
the webManager weakly desires that the website is allocated to the fast server (i.e., when
ρuse(fast) < 0.5).
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Fig. 10: Percentage of times in which the permission instance is followed, percentage of
times in which the prohibition instance is followed and percentage of inconsistencies that
remain unresolved for each resolution strategy. In Situation A ρuse(fast) ≥ 0.5. In Situation
B ρuse(fast) < 0.5.
We see that in both situations, both the conditional order and the coherence approach
determine that the permission should prevail in the majority of cases. This is reasonable,
since the addition of a desire that is hindered by the prohibition increases the appropriateness
of the permission. Moreover, both approaches determine that the lower the desirability of
this desire, the lower the prevalence of the permission norm. However, this decrease is more
noticeable if the coherence approach is used; i.e., when coherence is used the prevalence
of the permission norm is reduced by 88%, whereas when the conditional order is used the
prevalence of the permission norm is reduced by 87%. Thus we see that with the coherence
approach, the desire has less of an influence on the decision when it is less strongly desired.
Coherence approach more often avoids undesired instances. We have performed calcula-
tions to determine how often during our experiment each of the approaches selected an
instance to comply with that is not desired. Again, we assume that agents are situated an
non-deterministic environment under uncertainty and, as a consequence, they cannot infer
with certainty the interest of a website (i.e., if it is true that the user desires to allocate a web
page to the fast server). We determine whether this is the case probabilistically, where the
probability with which the user wants to allocate a web page to fast is the desirability of
use(fast). In particular, we analysed those runs in which the user wants to allocate a web
page to fast and determine that:
– in 1.59% of these runs, the coherence approach returns an instance that is not desired
(i.e., it returns the prohibition instance);
– in 48.97% of and runs, the static order approach returns an instance that is not desired;
– in 6.01% of and runs, the conditional order approach returns an instance that is not
desired.
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This analysis shows that the coherence approach is less likely than both the conditional and
the static order approaches to return an undesired instance.
5.3 Discussion of Results
As demonstrated by the experiments presented in this section, coherence allows the on-
line resolution of inconsistencies among instances by taking into account the cognitive and
normative elements. Our experiments demonstrate that the coherence approach adapts its
decision to the particular situation and obtains more appropriate results than either the static
or the conditional order, particularly when it is not obvious from the information that must
be taken into account which instance should prevail. As a consequence, agents are able
to use the coherence approach to deal with dynamic and non-deterministic environments
controlled by norms, such as in the case study described in this section. In particular, our
experiments demonstrate that our coherence approach better suited than both the conditional
order and the static order approaches when faced with uncertainty in the estimation of the
ease of compliance, the certainty of the beliefs and the desirability of desires. Moreover,
coherence is a general solution that is not domain dependent and can be applied to scenar-
ios in which agents must resolve inconsistencies according to ambiguous, conflicting and
incomplete information. In contrast, approaches that depend on a predefined static order
based on the salience of the norms are unable to adapt to the agent’s circumstances, and the
conditional approach (which takes into account the degrees of all of the relevant normative
and cognitive elements) obtains undesirable results in some situations. Specifically, the ex-
periments demonstrate that the conditional order fails to deal well with information that is
incompatible with the instances23.
One of the most important features of coherence is that it allows controversial situations
(i.e., situations where the agent does not have enough information to make a decision) to
be identified by leaving the inconsistency unresolved; neither the static nor the conditional
approach are ever able to produce such a result. Unresolved inconsistencies give agents the
opportunity to postpone the decision and reason further. For example, agents may realise
that they are playing roles that entail responsibilities that they cannot fulfil and they may be
able to leave these roles or even delegate the tasks associated with these roles to other agents.
Moreover, coherence allows agents to postpone the resolution of the inconsistencies among
instances that cannot be fulfilled to a later iteration when the agent is able to fulfil some of
the instances. Furthermore, several and repeated unsolved inconsistencies may be a sign of
a problem with the normative system (e.g., norms may be impossible to fulfil), and agents
may be able to propose a change to the normative system. Thus, unresolved inconsistencies
can be considered as an opportunity to take into account more action possibilities such as
delegating some tasks, reassigning roles, proposing a change to the normative system, etc.
It should be noted that improving agent capabilities for decision-making in resolving
normative inconsistencies at run-time obviously comes at an additional computational cost.
Specifically, coherence maximisation is an NP-complete problem [40]. In particular, the
computational cost of computing coherence to resolve inconsistencies using an exhaustive
algorithm that explores all possible solutions to the inconsistencies is given by O(2|NI |).
The cost of resolving inconsistencies using a static order is given by O(|NI |) which is the
23 We have considered alternative methods for calculating the conditional order (e.g., in the previous ex-
periment about the activation and expiration beliefs we have also tried to calculate the conditional order as
ρFs +ρ
F
c +ρhighTraffic(w)−(1−ρlowTraffic(w))
4
), but these methods have also produced undesirable results.
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cost of selecting the instance that has been created out of the most salient norm. Similarly,
the cost of resolving an inconsistency using a conditional order is given by O(|C|), where
C is the set of conditions that determine under which circumstances each instance pre-
vails. Using either the static order or conditional order to solve normative inconsistencies
is clearly less computationally expensive than using the coherence approach, however, with
these resolution strategies only one instance prevails, regardless of the number of inconsis-
tent instances, while the coherence approach allows multiple instances to prevail. Moreover,
coherence can be regarded as a suitable alternative to these resolution strategies because
there already exist approximate resolution methods that can efficiently determine a set of
elements to accept that have a satisfactory, if not maximal, degree of coherence [39]. Thus,
agents with bounded rationality that may use a range of different algorithms, from exhaustive
to incremental, for calculating coherence maximisation in order to resolve inconsistencies
of normative instances where the number of instances determines the size of the problem
and so the feasibility of using an optimal algorithm.
6 Experiments with Larger Sets of Instances
In the previous section we compared the performance of the coherence approach with ap-
proaches that determine which instance should prevail based on an order over the norms;
since such approaches are only able to select the most preferred instance, the experiments
in the previous section only considered two specific inconsistent instances. In these experi-
ments a particular case of the inconsistency of instances (Definition 4) is considered. How-
ever, the support function for instances (Definition 16) calculates the incoherence degree
in the same way for all cases of inconsistency between instances, which entails that these
results can be generalised to other examples with two inconsistent instances.
A significant benefit of the coherence approach over approaches that only produce an
order over the norms is that it is able to determine a subset of instances to comply with when
faced with a set of instances in which there are several inconsistencies. In this section we
analyse the behaviour of the coherence approach in such situations and consider the two
different methods for calculating the coherence of partitions (sum of satisfied constraints
and sum of satisfied constraints divided by the cardinality of the accepted set).
6.1 Experimental set up
We implemented a random scenario generator that takes as input x ∈ N and creates the
elements of the coherence graph with x instances as follows.
– A set of atomic propositions P is created such that the size of P is randomly determined
to be in the interval [3, 10].
– A set of literals L is created such that for each atom in P we have a positive literal and
a negative literal: i.e., ∀p ∈ P : p ∈ L ∧ ¬p ∈ L.
– A set of roles R is created such that the size of R is randomly determined to be in the
interval [1, 5].
– A set N of x norm expressions is created. For each norm expression (n, ρs) ∈ N :
– the deontic modality of n is randomly selected from the set {O,P,F};
– the norm condition of n is a single literal randomly selected from L;
– the activation condition of n is a single literal randomly selected from L;
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– the expiration condition of n is a single literal randomly selected from L;
– the target of n is a single role randomly selected from R;
– ρs (the salience of n) is randomly assigned as a real value within the interval [0, 1].
– For each norm n = 〈D,C, T,A,E〉 such that (n, ρs) ∈ N , an instance expression (i, ρc)
is created such that i = 〈D,C, T,A,E〉 and ρc (the ease of compliance of i) is randomly
assigned as a real value within the interval [0, 1]24.
– For each role r ∈ R, a graded belief belief (play(self , r), ρ) is created, such that the
certainty of the belief ρ is randomly assigned as a real value within the interval [0, 1].
– For each literal l ∈ L, a graded belief belief (l, ρ) is created, such that the certainty of
the belief ρ is randomly assigned as a real value within the interval [0, 1].
– For each literal l ∈ L, a graded desire desire(l, ρ) is created, such that the desirability
of the desire ρ is randomly assigned as a real value within the interval [0, 1].
Thus the random scenario generator produces a set of normative and cognitive elements
that must be considered to resolve any inconsistencies in the instances. Note that the sets of
propositions and literals are relatively small with respect to the number of instances that we
consider; this ensures that there are likely to be inconsistencies between the instances and in
fact we disregard any generated scenarios that do not contain at least one inconsistency. One
might argue that it is not realistic to consider scenarios where there are many inconsistencies,
since normative systems are typically designed with the aim of avoiding such situations;
however, in open, non-deterministic, dynamic environments it is possible that such situations
occur. Our coherence approach allows an agent to determine which subset of instances to
comply with when faced with multiple inconsistencies, something that is not possible with
existing approaches that depend on an order over the instances.
For each run of the experiment parametrised by x, a random scenario is generated with
x instances as described above. The number inc of inconsistencies that exist in the scenario
is calculated and then each of the sum of satisfied constraints and the sum of satisfied con-
straints divided by the cardinality of the accepted set methods is applied to calculate the
coherence of all possible partitions, producing the partition that maximises coherence for
each method. For each method, we calculate:
– the number x′ of instances in the partition that maximises coherence;
– the number inc′ of inconsistencies that exist in the partition that maximises coherence;
– the percentage of solved inconsistencies, i.e.,
inc− inc′
inc
× 100
– the percentage of instances that prevail, i.e.,
x′
x
× 100
For each x ∈ {2, . . . , 19, 20}, we performed 1000 runs of the experiment.
6.2 Results
Our results show that, for each calculation method (sum of satisfied constraints and sum of
satisfied constraints divided by the cardinality of the accepted set), the percentage of incon-
sistencies that are resolved is around 100%. This demonstrates that the coherence approach
24 Note that since we are assuming that the norm, activation and expiration conditions are literals, the
substitution for creating an instance from a norm is empty.
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Fig. 11: Average percentage of instances that prevail out of 1000 runs over randomly gen-
erated scenarios with n ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 19, 20} instances, using both the sum of satisfied con-
straints and the sum of satisfied constraints divided by the cardinality of the accepted set
methods to calculate coherence of partitions.
is well suited to dealing with situations in which there are multiple inconsistencies among
a set of instances, which are those where it is not possible to determine which subset of
instances should prevail by considering an order over the instances.
Figure 11 shows how the percentage of instances that prevail varies with the number
of instances in the randomly generated scenario for each of the two methods for calculat-
ing coherence. The error bars represent the 95% confidence interval for the percentages
obtained in the simulations. We see that the percentage of instances that prevail increases
as the number of instances increases for the two calculation methods. In particular, this in-
crease is more noticeable when coherence of partitions is calculated as the sum of satisfied
constraints. Thus we see that when coherence of partitions is calculated as the sum of sat-
isfied constraints divided by the cardinality of the accepted set, a smaller set of instances
prevails than when coherence of partitions is calculated as the sum of satisfied constraints.
In general, we can conclude that the sum of satisfied constraints method is more ro-
bust in coping with a high number of instances, since the percentage of prevalent instances
increases as more instances are considered. Thus, if an agent is endowed with enough re-
sources (e.g., time) for complying with norms, it is more appropriate to apply the sum of
satisfied constraints method for calculating coherence, since this allows a higher percentage
of the instances to prevail. When the agent is not able to comply with several instances, it
is more appropriate to calculate coherence of partitions as the sum of satisfied constraints
divided by the cardinality of the accepted set, since this method accepts smaller sets of
instances.
7 Related Work
In the existing literature, much work has also tackled the problem of resolving normative
inconsistencies. For example, this problem has been addressed from a logical and formal
perspective, e.g., the proposals contained in [29,16] describe logical formalisms and axioms
for representing and reasoning about conflicts in legal systems. Similarly, in [2,24] mech-
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anisms for checking the consistency of a normative system are proposed. In addition, this
problem has been explored in the context of practical reasoning; i.e., there are proposals for
the development of mechanisms to allow agents to select between inconsistent norms when
they deliberate about the next action to be performed. Given that our proposal falls into this
last category, this section reviews the most relevant proposals on inconsistency resolution in
agents.
Firstly, we start this section by considering the work of Joseph et al. in [23] that has
been taken as a reference for our proposal. Joseph et al.’s work is not focused on practical
reasoning in agents under the influence of inconsistent norms. Instead, Joseph et al. propose
a formalisation of deductive coherence for coherence-driven BDI agents that use coherence
maximisation as a theory revision process. The example contained in [23] illustrates the use
of coherence as a criterion for rejecting or accepting simple obligation norms. Thus, agents
are responsible for extending the normative system, but they are not endowed with mecha-
nisms for considering norms in practical reasoning; i.e., mechanisms for deciding what to
do according to their goals and the norms. In contrast, our proposal addresses the problem of
how normative agents under the influence of multiple possibly inconsistent instances make
a decision about which instances to comply with. Specifically, we propose to resolve nor-
mative inconsistencies according to coherence. In this paper, we propose a formalisation
of deductive coherence for resolving inconsistencies by means of a support function, as in
Joseph et al.’s proposal. However, the main focus of our formalisation is to resolve normative
inconsistencies and, as a consequence, the way in which we instantiate the coherence theory
is different from the work of Joseph et al. For example, our normative definitions include
normative elements such as activation and expiration conditions, norm target, salience and
ease of compliance. All these elements play a key role in norm compliance decisions and
should be considered when resolving normative inconsistencies. As a result, we propose new
functions for calculating the coherence among nodes of the coherence graph that take into
account the relationships among these normative elements and the cognitive elements. Our
coherence graph only contains nodes that are relevant to resolve normative inconsistencies
and only instances are rejected or accepted, which reduces noticeably the computational cost
of the coherence maximisation process. We also propose different methods for calculating
the coherence of partitions and resolving norm inconsistencies. Finally, our paper provides
an experimental evaluation to analyse the performance of our solution for resolving incon-
sistencies across different examples and situations.
The problem of resolving inconsistencies among norms and other mental attitudes has
been tackled by several authors. To name some examples, in [32] Modgil and Luck propose
a framework for argumentation-based resolution of conflicts amongst desires and norms. In
this framework, agents reason about arguments for and against compliance with norms. The
topic addressed by our paper is slightly different. Here, we focus on resolving inconsisten-
cies among instances. In our opinion, the solutions provided to this problem by the existing
literature are too rigid to be used in dynamic and non-deterministic environments. For exam-
ple, in [7] the authors assume that there is a norm hierarchy that determines the importance
of norms and allows agents to resolve inconsistencies. Similarly, in [12] the authors assume
that agents have a preference order among norms.
In [25], Kollingbaum describes NoA agents, which are agents governed by norms in
their practical reasoning. Based on the characteristics of the NoA model, a classification and
resolution strategy for inconsistencies among instances is presented. Specifically, the authors
propose to resolve inconsistencies by: arbitrary decision, selecting the most recent instance,
following the most restrictive instance, following the most general instance, following the
most restrictive instance, or following the instance that has been created out of the most
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salient norm. Some of these strategies are analysed in more detail in [26], and all of them
imply that a static and predefined criterion is followed to resolve inconsistencies.
In [21] Gartner proposes a model of agency in which norms determine the agent be-
haviour. Gartner’s work also takes into account the possibility that inconsistencies among
norms may arise. As a solution to this problem, Gaertner proposes the use of an argumentation-
based approach and a preference function that prioritises certain norms over others. Thus,
one can consider preferences as describing the normative personality of an agent. However,
these preferences are also specified by the agent programmer in a static way, entailing a
limitation on the agents’ capabilities for adapting to changing environments.
The BOID proposal [4] consists on an extension of the BDI architecture with an explicit
notion of obligation. BOID agents violate norms only due to an inconsistency among obliga-
tions, desires or intentions. These inconsistencies are resolved by means of a static ordering
function that is hard-wired in agents to determine which proposition prevails. Therefore,
BOID agents always consider inconsistencies in the same manner; i.e., they cannot decide
which norm prevails according to their current circumstances.
As demonstrated by our experiments in Section 5, even in simple cases where an agent
has to make a decision between two inconsistent instances, using a static and predefined
order based on the importance of norms does not produce satisfactory results. When agents
belong to open and dynamic environments, static defined orders are unsuitable for resolv-
ing normative inconsistencies since the circumstances might change, making the predefined
order obsolete [13]. Our experiments demonstrate that the dynamic circumstances in which
norms are instantiated are an important factor when resolving normative inconsistencies,
which cannot be captured by a static order or preference.
In a more recent proposal, Vasconcelos et al. [41] propose to avoid inconsistencies
among instances by curtailing the scope of norms that may cause inconsistencies when they
are instantiated. To determine which instance prevails in case of inconsistency, the authors
use orders, or policies, that determine, given a pair of instances, which one is to be cur-
tailed. Orders may include conditions that determine under which specific circumstances
instances of a norm prevail. Thus, inconsistencies are resolved in a more elaborate way. As
shown by Vasconcelos et al., classic forms of deontic conflict resolution, such as lex poste-
rior (the most recent instance takes precedence) and lex superior (the instance imposed by
the strongest power takes precedence) [28], can be represented as a conditional order. The
solution proposed in our paper is somewhat similar to Vasconcelos et al.’s proposal, since
both resolve inconsistencies by taking the agent’s circumstances into account. However, as
demonstrated by our experiments in Section 5 Vasconcelos et al.’s approach depends on
conditional orders that are statically defined by the agent programmer off-line and may lose
their validity at execution time, causing the conditional order approach to lead to undesirable
results in certain situations.
All the aforementioned proposals determine that only one instance prevails (e.g., the
instance that has been created out of the most salient norm) in case of inconsistency among
several instances. In [34] Oren et al. propose the use of heuristics that have been defined in-
side argumentation theory [15] to solve normative inconsistencies among a set of instances
in which several instances hold. Their work represents inconsistencies between instances as
a graph in which the nodes are instances, and the arcs represent inconsistencies between in-
stances. Basically, Oren et al. use a partial order among norms to determine which instances
prevail in case of an inconsistency. When it is not possible to resolve all inconsistencies,
then different heuristics are used to prune the graph and minimise the number of inconsis-
tencies. Even though this work requires a predefined partial order among norms, it is one
of the first proposals to deal with the resolution of inconsistencies among several instances.
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However, it uses a very simple notion of norms as unconditional deontic propositions whose
validity is taken for granted. As argued by Oren et al. in [34], this simple notion of norm
does not allow relationships among norms to be specified. For example, it is not able to deal
with groups of instances that are applicable under the same circumstances (e.g., a contract
violation) and that may have to be considered together. Our proposal considers this type of
relationship among norms by explicitly representing the circumstances under which norms
are applicable. Thus, our coherence graph contains not only the instances and the inconsis-
tency links, as in the proposal of Oren et al., but also norms and other cognitive elements
that are relevant in resolving the inconsistencies.
8 Conclusion, Discussion and Future Work
Norms are used in multi-agent systems to restrict the potential excesses of agents’ au-
tonomous behaviours. The set of norms that are applicable to an agent changes during its
execution and, as a consequence, it is possible that at some point the agent is affected by in-
consistent instances. For this reason, normative agents require mechanisms that allow them
to resolve these inconsistencies. Current proposals for resolving such inconsistencies as-
sume that there is a predefined order among norms that determines which instance prevails
in the case of inconsistency (i.e., the instance created out of the most salient norm prevails).
A key drawback of these proposals is the fact that in the case of inconsistency just one
instance prevails. Thus, it is not clear how agents use this order to select which instances
prevail from a set of inconsistent instances. In addition, while a static order may be suffi-
cient for multi-agent systems in which there is high compliance with specifications, in open
multi-agent systems the performance of the system may be unpredictable, causing such a
fixed order among norms to lose its validity.
In this paper we propose the first mechanism for resolving inconsistencies among sets
of instances by computing a dynamic order that takes into account the cognitive and nor-
mative elements that are present in the agent knowledge base. Specifically, we propose a
formalisation of deductive coherence that provides agents with a computational process for
resolving inconsistencies in a dynamic and flexible way. To evaluate the performance of our
proposal, we carried out several experiments that compare the resolution of inconsistencies
between two instances by means of coherence and existing proposals. The results of these
experiments demonstrate that coherence allows agents to resolve the inconsistencies satis-
factorily by adapting the solution to different circumstances. Moreover, coherence allows
agents to identify controversial situations in which the most coherent decision is to leave the
inconsistency unsolved. For example, if an agent is unable to fulfil any of the inconsistent in-
stances, coherence determines that the inconsistency remains unresolved and the resolution
is postponed until the agent is able to comply with the inconsistent instances. Moreover,
these controversial situations allow agents to detect situations in which it makes sense to
reason about the delegation of tasks, the modification of the normative system, and so on.
We have demonstrated that our coherence approach is able to resolve inconsistencies
among large sets of instances, showing that it resolves almost all inconsistencies. Moreover,
the different ways in which the coherence of partitions can be calculated provides agents
with different views of norm inconsistency. Specifically, we identified: a calculation method
that provides solutions in which more instances are prevalent, and a calculation method that
rejects more instances. The former is of special interest to open and highly dynamic multi-
agent systems, since it is more robust with respect to the number of norms and instances. The
latter may be of interest to agents that have limited capability to comply with instances. In
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future work, we plan to test the usefulness of our proposal in real applications where agents
are situated in highly changing environments. Moreover, we will perform experiments with
several agents to assess the performance of coherence as a method to resolve normative in-
consistencies in environments populated by heterogeneous agents that use different methods
for this purpose.
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